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IS THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS INELIMINABLY
RELIGIOUS?*
Michael J. Perry**
The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed
existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very
moment when those who professed to believe in it were for
the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost
all other qualities and specific relationships-except that
they were still human. The world found nothing sacred in
the abstract nakedness of being human.1
We almost all accept ... that human life in all its forms is
sacred ... . For some of us, this is a matter of religious

faith; for others, of secular but deep philosophical belief.2

*

© 1993, Michael J. Perry.

** Howard J. Trienens Chair in Law, Northwestern University. I am grateful to

the faculty and students at the T. C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond, with whom I discussed a version of this essay in April, 1993, during my stay
as the George E. Allen Professor of Law. I am also grateful for their hospitality. I
owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor Gary Charles Leedes, who made it all
possible.
An earlier version of this essay was prepared for a conference on "Paradoxes of
Rights," sponsored by the Program in Law, Jurisprudence, and Social Thought of
Amherst College (November, 1992). I am grateful to have had the opportunity to
discuss a draft of the essay with several groups: faculty and students at the University of Notre Dame (October, 1992); the Fifth Annual Symposium on Law, Religion,
and Ethics, sponsored by the Hamline University School of Law (October, 1992); faculty and students at the Southern Methodist University School of Law (March, 1993);
and a Symposium on Conflicts of Law and Morality in a Free Society, sponsored by
the J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, Baylor University (April, 1993).
For helpful comments on a draft of the essay, or for helpful discussion, I am grateful
to many generous colleagues around the country.
This essay-which, I want to emphasize, is very much an unfinished work-is
the first installment in what I anticipate will be a series of connected essays (and,
eventually, a book) on "The Idea of Human Rights."
1. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINs OF ToTALITARIANISm 299 (Harvest ed. 1973)

(emphasis added).
2. Ronald Dworkin, "Life is Sacred. That's the Easy Part," N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
1993, § 6 (Magazine), at 36.
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The name of the state where I was born and raised-Kentucky-derives from a Native American word meaning "the dark
and bloody ground."3 Were there an Indian word for "the dark
and bloody time," it would aptly name this century, a century
as unrelentingly dark and bloody as any in human history. In
the midst of all the terrible inhumanity of the twentieth century, however, there is a hopeful story: the emergence in international law of the idea of human rights.4
The increased and increasing protection of human rights by
international law in the period since the end of the Second
World War is an important and hopeful story, amply recounted
elsewhere.' But it is not a story that should dispel our skepticism about the extent to which many basic human rights, notwithstanding their protection by international law, are really
any better off now than they were before 1945. Even as the

3. For an explanation, see DARCY O'BRIEN, A DARK AND BLOODY GROUND 1
(1993).
4. The idea of human rights, in one form or another, is very old. See LESZEK
KOLAKOWSKI, MODERNITY ON ENDLESS TRIAL 214 (1990):
It is often stressed that the idea of human rights is of recent origin, and
that this is enough to dismiss its claims to timeless validity. In its contemporary form, the doctrine is certainly new, though it is arguable that
it is a modern version of the natural law theory, whose origins we can
trace back at least to the Stoic philosophers and, of course, to the Judaic
and Christian sources of European culture. There is no substantial difference between proclaiming "the right to life" and stating that natural law
forbids killing. Much as the concept may have been elaborated in the
philosophy of the Enlightenment in its conflict with Christianity, the
notion of the immutable rights of individuals goes back to the Christian
belief in the autonomous status and irreplaceable value of the human
personality.
5. See, e.g., ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.T., CRY OF THE OPPRESSED: THE HISTORY AND
HOPE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1987); Louis B. Sohn, "The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States," 32 AM. U. L.
REV. 1 (1982).
There are many good studies of different aspects of the international law of
human rights. See, e.g., PHILLIP ALSTON, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL (1992); I, H HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
PoLicY ISSUES, (Theodore Meron ed., 1984). For relatively brief overviews of the international law of human rights, see THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL (1988); ScOTT DAVIDSON, HUMAN RIGHTS (1993). Two good
periodical sources of articles are the HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK and the
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY.
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twentieth century ends, the furious slaughter of innocents continues-most famously, perhaps, in the former Yugoslavia. 6
Neither that story nor that skepticism is the subject of this
essay, however. The internationalization of human rights-and
the attendant rhetoric of human rights so pervasive in the
world today, especially in the western world, present an important occasion, in my view, for addressing several fundamental
questions about the idea of human rights.
The idea of human rights-the idea that has emerged in
international law in the period since the Second World War-is
complex. In the book of which this essay is a part, I mean to
explore all the main constituents of the idea. In this essay,
however, I am interested only in one constituent-albeit, a
foundational one: the conviction that every human being is sacred. Is that conviction inescapably religious, and the idea of
human rights, therefore, ineliminably religious?
I.
"The International Bill
called, consists of three
Universal Declaration of
amble, of "the inherent

of Human Rights," as it is sometimes
documents. The first of these, the
Human Rights,' speaks, in the Predignity ...

of all members of the

6. On the day I write these words, June 2, 1993, there is a story in the New
York Times which vividly describes the bloodshed:
[mlortar shells exploded today [June 1] amid a neighborhood soccer tournament, killing at least a dozen people and wounding at least 80 in the
worst single incident in a year in the bombardment of [Sarajevo] by the
Bosnian Serb forces.
Shrapnel-peppered cars, drying pools of blood, a few shreds of bloodsoaked clothing and a worn-out soccer ball were all that remained afterward in the parking lot where about 100 players and spectators had
gathered for the game.
The attack came on a day of chaotic violence across Bosnia and
Herzogovina that was shocking even by local standards and confirmed
the fears of many people here that the war in this former Yugoslav republic, which has already claimed tens of thousands of lives, is only
getting worse.
Chuck Sudetic, Mortar Fire Kills 12 at Soccer Game in Bosnian Capital, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 1993, at Al.
7. GA. Res. 217A (i), U.N. GAOR, 3d. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/180 (1948) [hereinafter
Universal Declaration].
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human family" and of "the dignity and worth of the human person."' In Article 1, the Declaration proclaims: "All human beings . . . should act towards one another in a spirit of brother-

hood."9 The second and third documents of the International
Bill of Human Rights are the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights'0 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights." The Preamble common to
both covenants echoes the Universal Declaration, speaking of
"the inherent dignity... of all members of the human family."
The Preamble then states: "[T]hese rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person .... " A fourth document,
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man2
begins: "The American peoples have acknowledged the dignity
of the individual .... The American states have on repeated
occasions recognized that the essential rights of man are not
derived from the fact that he is a national of a certain state,
but are based upon attributes of his human personality .....
The Preamble to the American Declaration proclaims: "All
men ...

should conduct themselves as brothers to one anoth-

er." 13 A fifth document, the American Convention on Human
Rights,' 4 echoes the American Declaration, stating in the Preamble that "the essential rights of man are not derived from
one's being a national of a certain state, but are based upon
attributes of the human personality ... ."'" Similarly, the Pre-

amble to the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights 6 (1986) proclaims that "fundamental human rights
stem from the attributes of human beings ...

8. Id. at pmbl.
9. Id. at art. 1.
10. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1976).
11. Id.
12. O.A.S. Res. XXX, 9th Int'l Conf. of Am. States, Bogata, Supp. No. 43, at 133
(1949).
13. Id. at pmbl.
14. O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser L/V/lI, 23, Doc. 21 rev. 6
(1979).
15. Id. at pmbl.
16. O.A.U. Doc. CAB/Lc6/67/3 Rev. 5 (1981).
17. Id. at pmbl.
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The idea of human rights that informs these various international human rights documents (and many others) is, in part,
the idea that there is something about each and every human
being, simply as a human being, such that certain things ought
not to be done to him or her and certain other things ought to
be done for him or her.18 The "every human being, simply as a
human being," is represented in Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by this language: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status."19 The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights each contain identical language.
The question to which this formulation of the idea of human
rights gives rise is this: What, precisely, is that "something
about each and every human being, simply as a human being"-such that certain things ought not to be done to us and
certain other things ought to be done for us? To ask the question in the words of the American Declaration, the American
Convention, and the African Charter, what are the relevant
"attributes" of each and every human being-the attributes on
which "the essential rights of man" are based? The principal
such attribute, according to the documents of the International
Bill of Human Rights, is "the inherent dignity of all members of
the human family," from which derive human rights.
What are we to make of such talk: talk about "the inherent
dignity" of all human beings-about all human beings as members of one "family"-and about the importance, therefore, of all
human beings acting towards one another "in a spirit of brotherhood"? It is easy enough to understand such language as religious talk. 20 But is it possible, finally, to understand such talk
18. For some "certain things," the "ought" and the "ought not" may be presumptive

rather than unconditional or absolute.
19. Article 2 continues: "Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of
the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which
a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any
other limitation of sovereignty."
20. But cf. Robert Ombres, OP, The Ethics of Human Rights, L. & JUSTICE, No.
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in a nonreligious ("secular") sense? Is there, at least, a nonreli-

gious equivalent for such talk-and, if so, what is it? Or must
we conclude that the idea of human rights is indeed ineliminably religious-that a fundamental constituent of the conviction
that every human being is sacred (has "inherent dignity,"
is "an
21
end in himself," or the like), is inescapably religious?

1141115, 140 (1992) (stating, "[R]eferences to God, Nature and even Human Nature
were deleted from the drafts of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
shortly before its adoption.").
21. Nietzsche, was unrelentingly contemptuous of the conviction that every human
being is sacred, as he reveals in this bleak and sobering passage from The Will to
Power:
In moving the doctrine of selflessness and love into the foreground,
Christianity was in no way establishing the interests of the species as of
higher value than the interests of the individual. Its real historical effect,
the fateful element in its effect, remains, on the contrary, in precisely
the enhancement of egoism, of the egoism of the individual, to an extreme (-to the extreme of individual immortality). Through Christianity,
the individual was made so important, so absolute, that he could no
longer be sacrificed: but the species endures only through human sacrifice- All "souls" became equal before God: but this is precisely the most
dangerous of all possible evaluations! If one regards individuals as equal,
one calls the species into question, one encourages a way of life that
leads to the ruin of the species: Christianity is the counter principle to
the principle of selection. If the degenerate and sick ("the Christian") is
to be accorded the same value as the healthy ("the pagan"), or even more
value, as in Pascal's judgment concerning sickness and health, then unnaturalness becomes lawThis universal love of men is in practice the preference for the suffering, underprivileged, degenerate: it has in fact lowered and weakened
the strength, the responsibility, the lofty duty to sacrifice men. All that
remains, according to the Christian scheme of values, is to sacrifice oneself: but this residue of human sacrifice that Christianity concedes and
even advises has, from the standpoint of general breeding, no meaning at
all. The prosperity of the species is unaffected by the self-sacrifice of this
or that individual (-whether it be in the monkish and ascetic manner
or, with the aid of crosses, pyres, and scaffolds, as "martyrs" of error).
The species requires that the ill-constituted, weak, degenerate, perish: but
it was precisely to them that Christianity turned as a conserving force; it
further enhanced that instinct in the weak, already so powerful, to take
care of and preserve themselves and to sustain one another. What is
"virtue" and "charity" in Christianity if not just this mutual preservation,
this solidarity of weak, this hampering of selection? What is Christian
altruism if not the mass-egoism of the weak, which divines that if all
care for one another each individual will be preserved as long as
possible?-
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II.
What does it means to say that a conviction, belief, idea,
worldview, etc., is or is not "religious"?22
In Sources of the Self." The Making of the Modern Identity,
Charles Taylor has observed that "[tihe problem of the meaning
of life is ...

on our agenda, however much we may jibe at the

phrase."' The problem of the meaning of life does not arise
for everyone. It is not on everyone's agenda, even if, as Taylor
says, it is on the agenda of "our" age. But it does arise for
many. The problem can even arise again for someone, after it
had been resolved, or repressed-someone who had been convinced of the meaningfulness of life, and especially of her own
life, but whose conviction has been gradually eroded or perhaps
suddenly shattered. A principal occasion of its arising or arising
again-at least, of its arising in an existential, as distinct from
a merely intellectual, way-is a searing encounter with such
common but elemental events as sickness, old age, and death.
Another principal occasion is an encounter, whether personal or
vicarious, with evil and the terrible, primal suffering evil causes. Such experiences can leave one with a feeling that she is, or
might be, a stranger, an alien, an exile, homeless, anxious,
vulnerable, threatened, in a world, a universe, that is, finally
If one does not feel such a disposition as an extreme immorality, as a
crime against life, one belongs with the company of the sick and possesses its instincts oneselfGenuine charity demands sacrifice for the good of the species-it is
hard, it is full of self-overcoming, because it needs human sacrifice. And
this pseudo humaneness called Christianity wants it established that no
one should be sacrificedFRIEDERICH NmTSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 141-42 (Walter Kaufman ed., Walter
Kaufman & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967).
22. My discussion here is adapted from a longer discussion elsewhere. See MICHAEL
J. PERRY, LovE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS, ch. 5 (1991).
23. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 18 (1989). Taylor also observes that "those whose spiritual agenda is mainly defined in this way are in a fundamentally different existential predicament from that
which dominated most previous cultures and still defines the lives of other people
today." Id. On the "notorious vagueness" of the question "what is the meaning of
life?", see W.D. Joske, Philosophy and the Meaning of Life, in The Meaning of Life
248, 248 et seq. (E.D. Klemke ed., 1981). See also R. Hepburn, Questions about the
Meaning of Life, in id. at 209.
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and radically, unfamiliar, hostile, perhaps even pointless, absurd. Albert Camus wrote:
What, then, is that incalculable feeling that deprives the
mind of the sleep necessary to life? A world that can be
explained even with bad reasons is a familiar world.
But,... in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and
lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without
remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home
or the hope of a promised land. This divorce between man
and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity. 4
Because of its radically alienating character, any such experience can be an occasion of existential confrontation with the
problem of meaning: Am I indeed an alien, an exile, homeless,
in a world, a universe, that is strange, hostile, pointless, absurd? Or, instead, is the world, finally and radically, familiar,
even gracious; does the world have a point, is it a project; is the
world, in that sense, meaningful: meaning-full, full of meaning
rather than bereft of it (and therefore meaning-less, absurd)? In
particular,is the world hospitable to me in my deep yearning to
be at home, rooted, connected?2 5 For the person deep in the
grip of, the person claimed by, the problem of meaning, "[tlhe
cry for meaning is a cry for ultimate relationship, for ultimate
belonging," wrote Abraham Heschel"

24. ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS 5 (1944; Eng. tr.
1955). See LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, THE PRESENCE OF MYTH (1989), especially chapter 8:
"The Phenomenon of the World's Indifference." Compare BLAISE PASCAL, PENSEES 95
(Penguin Books ed. 1966): "The eternal silence of these infinite spaces fills me with
dread."
25. See DAvID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE
87 (1987)

Like strictly metaphysical questions, religious questions must be questions
on the nature of Ultimate Reality. Unlike metaphysical questions, religious questions deliberately ask the question of the meaning and truth of
Ultimate Reality not only as it is in itself but as it is existentially related
to us. The religious classics are testimonies to the responses of the religions to those questions.
Id. (emphasis added).
26. ABRAHAM HESCHEL, MAN IS NOT ALONE (1951).
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It is a cry in which all pretensions are abandoned. Are we
alone in the wilderness of time, alone in the dreadfully
marvelous universe, of which we are a part and where we
feel forever like strangers? Is there a Presence to live by? A
Presence worth living for, worth dying for? Is there a way
of living in the Presence? Is there a way of living compatible with the Presence?27
One fundamental response to the problem of meaning is "religious": the trust that the world is finally meaningful in a way
hospitable to our deepest yearnings. The word "religion" derives
from the Latin verb "religare," which means to bind together
again that which was once bound, but has since been torn or
broken; to heal.2 8 A "religious" vision, then, etymologically understood, is a vision of final and radical reconciliation, a set of
beliefs about how one is or can be bound or connected to the
world-to the "other" and to "nature"-and, above all, to ultimate reality in a profoundly intimate way. If an ideology is not
grounded or embedded in a vision of the finally or ultimately
meaningful-the ultimately reconciling-nature of the world, it
is a confusion, on the understanding of religion I'm presenting
here, to think of that ideology as "religious;" even if the ideology, like Marxism, is all-encompassing.2 9
Throughout human history it has been the so-called religious
"mystics" who have trusted most deeply, and affirmed most
passionately, the ultimate meaningfulness of reality."0 Al-

27. Id.; Cf. FYEDER DOSTOEvsKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 235 (1976). (Ralph E.
Matlaw ed. & Constance Ganett trans.).
For the secret of man's being is not only to live but to have something
to live for. Without a stable conception of the object of life, man would
not consent to go on living, and would rather destroy himself than re-

main on earth, though he had bread in abundance.
(This is one of the Grand Inquisitor's statements in chapter 5 of Book Five.)
28. Cf the meaning given the word "religion" in OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 568
(13th ed. 1989).
29. See David Braybrooke, Ideology, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 124 (P. Ed-

wards ed., 1967).
30. Harvey Egan has written that "there is a sense in which all great religions are
mystical at heart and that mysticism is the full-flowering of any religious tradition."
HARVEY D. EGAN, WHAT ARE THEY SAYING ABOUT MYSTICISM? 17 (1982).
According to Wayne Proudfoot, the very ubiquity of mystical experience among
the world religions suggests that mysticism may be regarded as "a paradigm of reli-
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though her experience that the world is ultimately meaningful
is deeply personal, the religious mystic denies that the experience is reducible to an idiosyncratic, perhaps even pathological,
psychological state. Notwithstanding its noetic quality, however,
and for all its potency, the mystical experience is often, if not
invariably, transitory."' Moreover, not everyone is graced by
such experience, or graced as often, or to the same degree. In
the aftermath of mystical experience, therefore, or in its absence, fundamental questions about the meaningfulness of human existence-questions that so thoroughly pervade, and so
relentlessly subvert, our lives-remain in need of answers that
are intellectually satisfying and emotionally resonant. In Milan
Kundera's The Unbearable Lightness of Being, the narrator,
speaking of "the questions that had been going through Tereza's
head since she was d child," 2 says that:

gious experience." WAYNE PROUDFOOT, RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE xviii (1985). Some commentators distinguish between two fundamental types of mystical experience or of
union with God or the Absolute: (1) the experience of union, but not identity with
God (as attsted to by mystics in theistic traditions such as Christianity, Judaism,
and Islam), and (2) the experience of complete absorption into the divine. But compare the following excerpt from Proudfoot:
The terms in which the subject understands what is happening to him
are constitutive of the experience; consequently those in different traditions have different experiences. Jewish and Buddhist mystics [for example] bring entirely different doctrinal commitments, expectations, and
rules for identifying their mental and bodily states to their experiences,
and thus devekuth and nirvana cannot be the same.
Id. at 121.
31. According to William James, "transience" is a third mark of mystical experience. Commenting on James, Proudfoot writes:
The two secondary marks by which James characterizes the mystical
state, transience and passivity, are also related to the noetic quality of
the experience. Passivity conveys the sense of being grasped and of being
subject to some power beyond oneself. Both passivity and transience reflect the perception that the experience is not under the subject's voluntary control. It cannot be manipulated or guaranteed by the subject's
decision or by causes that he might set in motion. He can prepare himself for it, but the experience is finally not subject to his control. The
rules for the identification of an experience as mystical include the condition that he judge it to be something other than an artifact of his own
thought and actions.
PROUDFOOT, supra note 30, at 147-48.
32. MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 139 (Michael H. Heim
trans., Harper Row 1984).
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[tihe only truly serious questions are ones that even a child
can formulate. Only the most naive of questions are truly
serious. They are the questions with no answers. A question
with no answer is a barrier than cannot be breached. In
other words, it is questions with no answers that set the
limits of human possibilities, describe the boundaries of
human existence.'

Communities, especially historically, extended communities---'traditions"-are the principal matrices and repositories of
religious answers to such questions: 4 Who are we? Where did
we come from; what is our origin, our beginning? Where are we
going; what is our destiny, our end?"5 What is the meaning of
suffering? Of evil? Of death? And there is the cardinal question,
the question that comprises many of the others: Is the world
ultimately meaningful or, instead, ultimately bereft of meaning,
meaning-less, absurd? If any questions are fumdamental, these

questions-'religious or limit questions'q--are fundamental.
Such questions---naive" questions, "questions with no answers,"
"barriers that cannot be breached"-are:

33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. See Abraham Heschel, Faith, in 10 THE RECONSTRUCTIONIsT 4, Nov. 3 & 17,

1944.
Not the individual man nor a single generation by its own power, can
erect the bridge that leads to God. Faith is the achievement of many
generations, an effort accumulated over centuries. Many of its ideas are
as the light of the star that left its source a long time ago. Many enigmatic songs, unfathomable today, are the resonance of voices of bygone
times. There is a collective memory of God in the human spirit, and it is
this memory which is the main source of our faith.
Id. at 4. For a later statement on faith, incorporating some of the original essay,
see ABRAHAt HESCHEL, MAN IS NOT ALONE 159-76 (1951). On community/tradition as

a principal matrix of moral beliefs, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND
LAW 24-33 (1988).
35. See ROBERT COLES, THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN 37 (1990) (The questions
Tolstoy asked, and Gauguin in, say, his great Tahiti triptych, completed just before

he died ('Where Do We Come From? What Are We? Where Are We Going?'), are the
eternal questions children ask more intensely, unremittingly, and subtly than we
sometimes imagine.") Cf. HEScHEL, supra note 34, at 28 ("In an old rabbinic text
three other questions are suggested: 'Whence did you come?' 'Whither are you going?'
'Before whom are you destined to give account?) (citations omitted).
36. TRACY, supra note 25, at 86.
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[t]he most serious and difficult... that any human being
or society must face .... To formulate such questions honestly and well, to respond to them with passion and rigor,
is the work of all theology .... Religions ask and respond
to such fundamental questions .... Theologians, by definition, risk an intellectual life on the wager that religious
traditions can be studied as authentic responses to just
such questions. 7
To say that a conviction is "religious," therefore, is to say
that the conviction is embedded in-that it is an aspect, a constituent, of-a religious vision or cosmology; a vision according
to which the world is ultimately meaningful in a way hospitable to our deepest yearnings. (Of course, not every religious
tradition tells the same story about the way in which the world
is ultimately meaningful; often the stories are different, even if
sometimes the stories are quite similar.) To ask whether the
conviction that every human being is sacred-the conviction
that every human being has "inherent dignity," is "an end in
himself," or the like-is inescapably religious is to ask whether
the conviction can be embedded in, if it can cohere with, if it
can be supported by, either a nonreligious cosmology, (according
to which the world is, at the end of the day, not meaningful
but meaningless) or a cosmological agnosticism that neither
affirms nor denies the ultimate meaningfulness of the world.
Real moralities-the moralities that various human communities have actually lived-have always been cosmologically embedded. In every human community across time and space,
[m]oral norms are closely linked to beliefs about the facts of
human life and the world in which human life is set ....
To know what people find good in human action, we must
know something about the powers and vulnerabilities they
find characteristically human, and about how they explain
the constraints that nature, power, finitude, and mortality
impose on persons ....
[Wihen they formulate moral norms and impose them on
themselves and others[, persons] are trying to formulate
relationships between realities and human purposes that

37. DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION 4 (1981).
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allow them 'to live as [they] would in a world that is the
way it is." 38
The conviction that every human being is sacred is cosmologi-

cally embedded; it is embedded in a religious cosmology. 39 Indeed in one or another version, the conviction is embedded in
more than one religious cosmology.40 The question before us is
whether the conviction can be embedded either in a nonreligious cosmology or in cosmological agnosticism.
III.
As I said, it is easy to understand talk about "the inherent
dignity" of all human beings and related talk-for example,
about all human beings as members of one "family"--as religious talk. But can we understand such talk in a secular sense?
I now want to present a religious version of talk about the
inherent dignity of all human beings; that is, I want to present
a religious version-the Christian version, or at least a Christian version-of the conviction that every human being is sacred. We will then be in a better position to discern whether
there is, indeed whether there can be, a coherent secular version of the conviction.
For Christians, the basic shape of the good life is indicated
by the instruction given by Jesus at a Passover seder on the
eve of his execution: "I give you a new commandment: love one
another; you must love one another just as I have loved
you."41 The "one another" is radically inclusive:
38. Robin Lovin & Frank Reynolds, Focus Introduction, 14 J. RELIGIOUS ETHIcs 48,
56-57 (1986). See id.; Robin Lovin & Frank Reynolds, In the Beginning, in COSMOGONY AND ETHICAL ORDER: NEW STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE ETHIcs 1, 1 (Robin Lovin &

Frank Reynolds eds., 1985).
39. Cf. NIETZSCHE, supra note 21, at 184 ("What is the counterfeiting aspect of
morality?-It pretends to know something, namely what 'good and evil' is. That
means wanting to know why mankind is here, its goal, its destiny. That means wanting to know that mankind has a goal, a destiny.. . "). What was Nietzsche's teleology? See id. at 544-50 (The Eternal Recurrence).

40. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
41. John 13:34. See John 15:12, 17 (This and the other translations in this essay
are those of The New Jerusalem Bible (1985)). See also GARTH HAILL
, CHRISTIAN
NEIGHBOR-LOVE:

AN ASSESSMENT OF Six RIvAL VERSIONS (1989). See generally THE
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You have heard how it was said, You will love your neighbor and hate your enemy. But I say this to you, love your
enemies and pray for those who persecute you; so that you
may be children of your Father in heaven, for he causes his
sun to rise on the bad as well as the good, and sends down
rain to fall on the upright and the wicked alike. For if you
love those who love you, what reward will you get? Do not
even the tax collectors do as much? And if you save your
greetings for your brothers, are you doing anything exceptional? Do not even the gentiles do as much? You must
therefore set no bounds to your love, just as your heavenly
Father sets none to his.42
But, why should we "love one another... as I have loved
you"? 43 The answer, in the vision of Judaism and Christianity,
nourished by what David Tracy has called "the analogical imagination,"44 is that the Other, too (the outsider, the stranger,
the alien) no less than oneself and the members of one's family
or tribe or nation, is a "child" of God-God the creator and sustainer of the universe, imag(in)ed, analogically, as loving "parent"4 -and therefore a "sister"'"brother." As Hilary Putnam
has written, the moral image central to what she calls the

LOvE COMMANtDMETs: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (E.

Santurri & W. Werpehowski, eds., 1992). For a recent collection of secular
philosophical essays on altruism, see 10 SOC. PHIL. & PoLY 1-245 (1993). On the
relation between the commandment to "love God" and the commandment to "love one
another," see infra note 61. Cf. NIETZSCHE, supra note 21, at 183 ("[Llove': the ideal
state of the herd animal that no longer wants to have enemies.").
42. Matthew 5:43-48 (emphasis added). See Luke 6:27-35. Such a conception of the
good is not confined to semitic spiritualities. For example, Buddhists feel the good life
centrally involves compassion (koruna) for all sentient creatures and therefore for all
human beings. Cf. NIETZSCHE, supra note 21, at 120.
One drives nature out of morality when one says "Love your enemies":
for then the natural "Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thy enemy"
in the law (in instinct) has become meaningless; then this love of one's
neighbor must also find a new basis (as a kind of love of God). Everywhere, God is inserted and utility withdrawn; everywhere the real origin
of morality is denied: the veneration of nature, which lies precisely in the
recognition of a natural morality, is destroyed at its roots ....
43. John 13:34.
44. TRACY, supra note 25.
45. In the Bible, God-Ultimate Reality-is often imaged as "parent," sometimes as
"father," sometimes as "mother." Cf. ELIZABETH JOHNSON, SHE WHO Is: THE MYSTERY
OF GOD IN FEMINIST THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE (1992).
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Jerusalem-based religions "stresse[s] equality and also fraternity, as in the metaphor of the whole human race as One Family,
of all women and men as sisters and brothers."4 6 At the beginning of its 1986 Pastoral Letter, the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops wrote:
This letter is a
resources of our
opportunities of
ter protects the
brothers both in

personal invitation to Catholics to use the
faith, the strength of our economy, and the
our democracy to shape a society that betdignity and basic rights of our sisters and
this land and around the world.47

In a recent essay on The Spirituality of The Talmud, Ben Zion
Bokser and Baruch M. Bokser state: "From this conception of
man's place in the universe comes the sense of the supreme
sanctity of all human life. 'He who destroys one person has
dealt a blow at the entire universe, and he who sustains or
saves one person has sustained the whole world.'"48 They con-

tinue:
The sanctity of life is not a function of national origin,
religious affiliation, or social status. In the sight of God, the
humble citizen is the equal of the person who occupies the
highest office. As one talmudist put it: "Heaven and earth I
call to witness, whether it be an Israelite or pagan, man or
woman, slave or maidservant, according to the work of
every human being doth the Holy Spirit rest upon
him."... As the rabbis put it: "We are obligated to feed
non-Jews residing among us even as we feed Jews; we are
obligated to visit their sick even as we visit the Jewish
sick; we are obligated to attend to the burial of their dead
even as we attend to the burial of the Jewish dead.49

46. HILARY PUTNAM, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM 60-61 (1987).
47. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Economic Justice for All, PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE ECONOMY (1986) (emphasis
added).
48. Ben Z. Bokser & Baruch M. Bokser, Introduction: The Spirituality of the Talmud, in THE TALMUD: SELECTED WRITINGS 7 (Ben Z. Bokser & Baruch M. Bokser
eds., 1989).

49. Id. at 30-31.
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Friedrich Nietzsche was relentlessly critical of what he called
"the concept of the 'equal value of men before God.' 50 That
concept, he wrote,
is extraordinarily harmful; one forbade actions and attitudes
that were in themselves among the prerogatives of the
strongly constituted-as if they were in themselves unworthy of men. One brought the entire tendency of the strong
into disrepute when one erected the protective measures of
the weakest (those who were weakest also when confronting
themselves) as a form of value.
Confusion went so far that one branded the very virtuosi
of life (whose autonomy offered the sharpest antithesis to
the vicious and unbridled) with the most opprobrious
names. Even now one believes one must disapprove of a
Cesare Borgia; that is simply laughable. The church has
excommunicated German emperors on account of their vices:
as if a monk or priest had any right to join in a discussion
about what a Frederick II may demand of himself. A Don
Juan is sent to hell: that is very naive. Has it been noticed
that in heaven all interesting men are missing?--Just a
hint to the girls as to where they can best find their salvation.-If one reflects with some consistency, and moreover
with a deepened insight into what a "great man" is, no
doubt remains that the church sends all "great men" to
hell-it fights against all "greatness of man."
The degeneration of the rulers and the ruling classes has
been the cause of the greatest mischief in history! Without
the Roman Caesars and Roman society, the insanity of
Christianity would never have come to power.
When lesser men begin to doubt whether higher men
exist, then the danger is great! And one ends by discovering
that there is virtue also among the lowly and subjugated,
the poor in spirit, and that before God men are
equal-which has so far been the non plus ultra of nonsense on earth! For ultimately, the higher men measured
themselves according to the standard of virtue of
slaves-found they were "proud," etc., found all their higher
qualities reprehensible.
When Nero and Caracalla sat up there, the paradox
arose: "the lowest man is worth more than the man up

50. NIETZSCHE, supra note 21, at 466.
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there!" And the way was prepared for an image of God that
was as remote as possible from the image of the most powerful-the god on the cross! 1
One might respond to the religious vision sketched here, if
not like Nietzsche, then this way: "Even if I assume, for the
sake of argument, that the Other is a 'child' of God and therefore my 'sister/brother', still, why should I love the Other? In
particular, why should I give a damn about the well-being of
her or him who is, in some deep sense, my sister or my brother?" For us-or, at least, for most of us-it is a fundamental
conviction, born not merely of our own experience, but of the
experience of the historically extended communities ("traditions") that for many of us have been formative. It is the tradition that an important constituent of one's own well-being-of
one's authentic flourishing as a human being-is concern for
the well-being of one's sisters and brothers. We believe, based
on that experience, that a life of loving connection to one's
sisters and brothers is, to that extent, a flourishing life and
that a life of unloving-uncaring-alienation from one's sisters
and brothers is, to that extent, a withering life. This fundamental conviction about human good-about what it means to be
truly, fully human, about what is of real and ultimate value in
life, about what makes a life most deeply meaningfal5 2-- is, for
us, bedrock; this is where our spade is turned. 3 There may be
little of resonance for us to say, if indeed there is anything, to
one who rejects the conviction-which, it bears emphasis, is not
necessarily, for a person whose conviction it is, a religious conviction. But there is this to say about one who rejects it: He is,
by our lights, no less in the grip of a pathology of estrangement
than if he were to reject that an important constituent of one's
own well-being is concern for the well-being of one's child, or
M The serious
spouse, or parent.5
question among us-some of
51. Id. at 466-68.
52. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUmi, ARISTOTLE ON HUMAN NATURE AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHiCS 22 (1990) ("[T]o find out what our nature is seems to be one and
the same thing as to find out what we deeply believe to be most important and indispensable [in a human life].").
53. See LUDWIG WITTGENsTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, § 217 (1953) (I
have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned." (quoting PUTNAM, supra note 46, at
85)).
54. Cf. ROBERT NOzIc, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 403 (1981).
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whom count ourselves religious, but others of whom do not-is
not whether a life of loving connection to our sisters and brothers is a flourishing life, but this: "Who is my sister? Who is my
brother?""5 Or, in a different but spiritually equivalent termi-

Recall Glaucon's challenge to Socrates in Plato's Republic: show that
being moral is better for the agent, apart from its external consequences.
To isolate these consequences, Glaucon imagines a ring that makes someone invisible. With this ring he is able to act immorally with no external
penalty: he can rob, murder, and rape without being caught or punished.
Is there any reason why he should not do this? Glaucon sharpens the
issue by imagining that the immoral man has the reputation of being
moral, he is honored and praised as moral, while another man is thought
to be immoral and so is condemned and shunned. Glaucon asks Socrates
to show, despite this, that the second moral person is better off than the
first immoral one, that we would be better off being that second than the
first.
Id.
[Tihe answer that [Plato] puts into the mouth of Socrates is that the just
man is happy because his soul is harmoniously ordered, because, as we
would say, he has an integrated personality, whereas the unjust man's
personality is disintegrated, and the man who represents the extreme of
injustice is psychotic, his soul is a chaos of internal strife.
JOHN MAcKE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 190-91 (1977). Should we take
Socrates' response seriously? See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHIcs AND THE LIMITS OF PHI-

LOSOPHY 46 (1985).
There is also the figure, rarer perhaps than Callicles supposed, but
real, who is horrible enough and not miserable at all but, by any ethological standard of the bright eye and the gleaming coat, dangerously
flourishing. For those who want to ground the ethical life in psychological
health, it is something of a problem that there can be such people at all.
But it is a significant question, how far their existence, indeed the
thought of their existence, is a cultural phenomenon. They seem sleeker
and finer at a distance. Some Renaissance grandee fills such a role with
more style than the tawdry fascist bosses, gangsters, or tycoons who
seem, even as objects of fantasy, to be their chief contemporary instances.
Perhaps we deceive ourselves about the past.
Id.
55. See James Burtchaell, The Source of Conscience, 13 NOTRE DAME MAG. 20, 20-

21 (Winter 1984-85).
The Catholic tradition embraces a long effort to uncover the truth about
human behavior and experience. Our judgments of good and evil focus on
whether a certain course of action will make a human being grow and
mature and flourish, or whether it will make a person withered, egtranged and indifferent. In making our evaluations, we have little to
draw on except our own and our forebears' experience, and whatever
wisdom we can wring from our debate with others ....
What we are trying to unpuzzle are things like childbearing and immigration and economic policy and infant mortality and drug use and
family fidelity and so much else about which we must frame moral judg-
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nology: "Who is my neighbor? 5 6-- which is the very question to
Jesus responded with the
which, according to Luke's Gospel,
57
Parable of the Good Samaritan.

ments. With our fellow communicants we share commitments and assumptions: that we are happier giving than getting, that there is no

greater love than to put down your life for your neighbor, and that your
neighbor always turns out to be the most unlikely person.
On our neighbor always turning out to be the most unlikely person, see infra
note 57 and accompanying text (Parable of the Good Samaritan). For a revised version of Burtchaell's essay, and for several other illuminating essays by Father Burtchaell, see James Butchaell, The Giving and Taking of Life (1989).
56. See Matthew 22:34-40.
But when the Pharisees heard that he had silenced the Sadducees they
got together and, to put him to the test, one of them put a further
question, "Master, which is the greatest commandment of the Law?"
Jesus said to him, "You must love the Lord your God with all your
heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the greatest
and the first commandment. The second resembles it: You must love your
neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments hang the ivhole Law,
and the Prophets too."
Id. See also Mark 12:28-34; Luke 10:25-28 (On the relation between the two commandments, see supra note 41.) Cf. MACKIE, supra note 54, at 243
David D. Raphael, in "The Standard of Morals," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 75 (1974-75) follows Edward Ullendorff in pointing out that whereas "Thou
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" represents the Greek of the Septuagint (Leviticus
19:18) and of the New Testament, the Hebrew from which the former is derived
means rather "You shall treat your neighbor lovingly, for he is like yourself." Thus,
Bruce Ackerman need not worry that he is being asked to love the "stranger" as
himself. That, protests Ackerman, "[olnly a God could do ... : there are too many
strangers with too many strangenesses." BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL
REVOLUTION 21 (1992).
57. See Luke 10:29-37
But the man was anxious to justify himself and said to Jesus, "And who
is my neighbour?" In answer Jesus said, "A man was once on his way
down from Jerusalem to Jericho and fell into the hands of bandits; they
stripped him, beat him and then made off, leaving him half dead. Now a
priest happened to be travelling down the same road, but when he saw
the man, he passed by on the other side. In the same way a Levite who
came to the place saw him, and passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan traveller who came on him was moved with compassion when he
saw him. He went up to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring oil and
wine on them. He then lifted him onto his own mount and took him to
an inn and looked after him. Next day, he took out two denarii and
handed them to the innkeeper and said, 'Look after him, and on my way
back I will make good any extra expense you have.' Which of these
three, do you think, proved himself a neighbour to the man who fell into
the bandits' hands?" [The man] replied, MThe one who showed pity towards him." Jesus said to him, "Go, and do the same yourself."
Id. In the annotation of The New Jerusalem Bible, a footnote appended to "Samari-

1042

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1023

One response to the question, a religious response, is that
the Other, too, is, in the deepest possible sense-i.e., as a child

of God-your sister/brother. To fail to "see" the Other as sister/brother is, according to this religious response to succumb to
a kind of blindness: blindness to the true nature or being both
of the Other and of oneself, which nature/being consists partly
in a profound kinship between self and Other. And to fail to
love the Other as sister/brother-worse, to hate the Other-is
to succumb to the pathology of estrangement." It is, to that
extent, to wither as a human being rather than to flourish.
That the estrangement is radical-indeed, that it is estrangement even from "the Lord your God" 5 9 -and involves the most
fundamental and enduring failure to achieve human well-being,
is emphasized in the searing "Last Judgment" passage of
Matthew:
When the Son of man comes in his glory, escorted by all
the angels, then he will take his seat on his throne of glory.
All nations will be assembled before him and he will separate people from one another as the shepherd separates
sheep from goats. He will place the sheep on his right hand
and the goats on his left. Then the King will say to those
on his right hand, "Come, you whom my Father has blessed, take as your heritage the kingdom prepared for you
since the foundation of the world. For I was hungry and
you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink, I
was a stranger and you made me welcome, lacking clothes
and you clothed me, sick and you visited me, in prison and
you came to see me." Then the upright will say to him in
reply, "Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or
thirsty and give you drink? When did we see you a stranger
and make you welcome, lacking clothes and clothe you?
When did we find you sick or in prison and go to see you?"
And the King will answer, "In truth I tell you, in so far as
you did this to one of the least of these brothers of mine,

tan" says that "Ithe contrast is between the element in Israel most strictly bound to
the law of love, and the heretic and stranger ... from whom normally only hate
could be expected." Id.
58. I may love the Other even if I do not understand that the Other is my sister/brother. And I may understand that the Other is my sister/brother, and yet fail to
love the Other.
59. See supra note 51-52 and accompanying text.
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you did it to me." Then he will say to those on his left
hand, "Go away from me, with your curse upon you, to the
eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was
hungry and you never gave me food, I was thirsty and you
never gave me anything to drink, I was a stranger and you
never made me welcome, lacking clothes and you never
clothed me, sick and in prison and you never visited me."
Then it will be their turn to ask, "Lord, when did we see
you hungry or thirsty, a stranger or lacking clothes, sick or
in prison, and did not come to your help?" Then he will
answer, "In truth I tell you, in so far as you neglected to do
this to one of the least of these, you neglected to do it to
me." And they will go away to eternal punishment, and the

upright to eternal life.'o

60. Matthew 25:31-46 (In Matthew's Gospel, these are Jesus' final words to his
disciples before the beginning of the passion narrative); see also Matthew 26:1-2: ("Jesus had now finished all he wanted to say, and he told his disciples, It will be Passover, as you know, in two days' time, and the Son of Man will be handed over to be
crucified."). See generally 6 KARL RAHNER, THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONs, 231, 236-39

(Karl H. Kruger & Boniface Kruger trans., 1969) (concerning Vatican Council 11).
In the view of great German Catholic theologian Karl Rahner, a view consistent
with the eschatology of the Last Judgment passage, not only is there no tension
between the commandment to love God and the commandment to love one another,
there is "a radical identity of the two loves." In his "Reflections on the Unity of the
Love of Neighbor and the Love of God," Rahner wrote:
It is radically true, i.e. by an ontological and not merely 'moral' or psychological necessity, that whoever does not love the brother whom he
sees, also cannot love God whom he does not see, and that one can love
God whom one does not see only by loving one's visible brother lovingly.
Rahner's reference is to a passage in John's First Letter in which it is written: "Anyone who says 'I love God' and hates his brother, is a liar, since whoever does not
love the brother whom he can see cannot love God whom he has not seen." I John
4:20. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (Parable of the Good Samaritan). In
Ralner's view, the two great commandments are really one. See id. at 232. Rahner
argued that, if and to the extent one loves one's neighbor one has achieved the ontological/existential state of being/consciousness that constitutes "love of God" even if
one does not "believe in God." Id. at 238-39. If Rabner is right, then it is a mistake,
a confusion, to say that one should love the Other because we love, or should love,
God and God wants us to-or because we fear, or should fear, God and God wants us
to. We may say, instead, that to love the Other (who is "sister/brother") just is to
love God (who is "parent")-and that we should achieve the ontological/existential
state of being/consciousness that constitutes "love of the Other," or "love of God," because that state is the highest human good. To have achieved that radically unalienated condition is to have become "truly, fully" human. "We are well aware that we
have passed over from death to life because we love our brothers. Whoever does not
love, remains in death." 1 John 3:14.
Has Rabner pushed a good idea-that no one can be judged to love God who
fails to love his/her neighbor-too far? One can accept that idea while rejecting
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The response of the Gospel to "Who is my sister/brother/neighbor?" is religious in the fundamental sense that
such a response is embedded in a religious vision of the world
and of our place in it. Of course, there are differences among
religious visions within the relevant range, sometimes large
differences, sometimes small. The analogical imagination does
not yield precisely the same vision in every time or in every
place. How a person or a community arrives at a religious vision is a difficult question; as is the question how one brings
another to such a vision. Moreover, different religious traditions, and even different theologies within the same broad religious tradition, proffer different answers to such questions.
It bears emphasis that a theistic religious vision does not
necessarily include a conception of "God" as a kind of divine
legislator, issuing directives for human conduct. (Indeed, a religious person may well believe that such a "God"-such an
idol-is dead.61 ) The imperative to "love one another as I have
loved you" can be understood, and should be understood, not as
a piece of divine legislation, but as a truly, fully human response to the question of how to live. However, to say that the
response is a human one does not entail that it is not also a
religious response. What makes the imperative a religious human response and not merely a secular one is that the response
is the existential yield of a religious conviction about how the

Rahner's identification of love of God with love of neighbor. Tim Jackson has suggested, in response, that "surely there is such a thing as the direct love of God, as for
instance in the ecstatic prayer of some mystics or in Holy Communion. Human beings

are social animals, no doubt, but they are also born for a vertical relation to the
Supernatural." Cf. JEAN PORTER, Salvific Love and Charity: A Comparison of the
Thought of Karl Rahner and Thomas Aquinas, in THE LOVE COMiMANDMENTS: ESSAYS
IN CHRISTIAN ETHMCS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 240, 240 n.30, (Edmond N. Santurri &
William Werpehowski, eds. 1992).
61. See C. Larmore, Beyond Religion and Enlightenment, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
000, 000-00 (forthcoming 1993) (On the death of such a "God"). Indeed, as my footnote references to Buddhism-whose "theological" discourse is, in the main, non-theistic-suggest, the vision is not necessarily even theistic in any conventional sense.
Whether mainline Buddhism is theistic in an unconventional sense is a difficult question. David Tracy, Kenosis, Sunyata, and Trinity: A Dialogue With Masao Abe, THE
EMPTYING GOD: A BUDDHIST-JEWISH-CHRISTIAN CONVERSATION 135 (John B. Cobb, Jr.
& Christopher Ives, eds., 1990).
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world (including we-in-the-world) hangs together: in particular,
the conviction that the Other is, finally, one's own sister/broshould receive, therefore, the gift of one's loving
ther-and
62
concern.

Indeed, a theistic religious vision is not necessarily attended
by confident, much less dogmatic, God-talk. If that statement
seems strange, consider what one scholar has recently stressed
about Thomas Aquinas, perhaps the greatest Christian theologian:
[Miuch of [Aquinas'] doctrine about talking about God is in
truth a carefully qualified via negativa .... Aquinas would
simply agree with modern antitheists that we cannot say
what God is; and that human language is inadequate to the
claimed reality of God; and that there is something improper even in saying that God is a being. But not only does
Aquinas think that none of these admissions disqualifies
him from theism; he actually thinks that the theist should
make these admissions."
Of course, and as Aquinas understood, to insist that we cannot
say what God is-that we can only follow a via negativa and
say what God is not-is not to deny that we can try to mediate
our experience of Ultimate Reality by analogy. For example, we
can speak of God as like a loving "parent," and of the Other as
like a "sisterPbrother." In addition to his "carefully qualified
via negativa ... Aquinas also has, of course, a via positiva
about God-talk, namely, the 'doctrine of analogy.'" 65 However,

62. In Buddhism, the relevant conviction is that the, appearances (illusions) to the
contrary notwithstanding, the other is not really Other at all, or in any deep
sense-is an object of infinite compassion. (The Buddhist greeting "Namast6" means,
roughly, "I greet the place within you where we are one.")
63. I have developed the point elsewhere. See PERRY, supra note 22, at 72-73. Nor
is such a vision necessarily attended by belief in an afterlife. Cf. Timothy R. Jackson,
The Disconsolation of Theology: Irony, Cruelty, and Putting Charity First, 20 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 1, 19 (1992) (arguing that "a future heaven and/or hell ought not to
play much of a role in [Christian] ethics, whatever role they may play in cosmology").
64. T.D.J. Chappell, Why'Read Aquinas?, TIMES LITERARY SuPP., May 1, 1992, at
25 (reviewing B. DAVIES, THE THOUGHT OF THOAS AQUINAS (1992)).
65. See TRACY, supra note 37 at 108-109. David Tracy's comments about the richness, the variety, but, finally, the problematic character-the limits-of all talk about
Ultimate Reality, and especially of God-talk (talk about God, "theo-logizing"), are
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compelling.
In and through even the best speech for Ultimate Reality, greater obscurity eventually emerges to manifest a religious sense of that Reality as
ultimate mystery. Silence may be the most appropriate kind of speech for
evoking this necessary sense of the radical mystery-as mystics insist
when they say, "Those who know do not speak; those who speak do not
know." The* most refined theological discourse of the classic theologians
ranges widely but returns at last to a deepened sense of the same ultimate mystery: the amazing freedom with all traditional doctrinal formulations in Meister Eckhart; the confident portrayals of God in Genesis and
Exodus become the passionate outbursts of the prophets and the painful
,reflections of Job, Ecclesiastes, and Lamentations; the disturbing light
cast by the biblical metaphors of the "wrath of God" on all temptations
to sentimentalize what love means when the believer says, "God is love";
the proclamation of the hidden and revealed God in Luther and Calvin;
the deus otiosus vision of God in the Gnostic traditions; the repressed
discourse of the witches; the startling female imagery for Ultimate Reality in both the great matriarchal traditions and the great Wisdom traditions of both Greeks and Jews; the power of the sacred dialectically divorcing itself from the profane manifested in all religions; the extraordinary subtleties of rabbinic writing on God become the uncanny paradoxes
of kabbalistic thought on God's existence in the very materiality of letters
and texts; the subtle debates in Hindu philosophical reflections on monism and polytheism; the many faces of the Divine in the stories of Shiva and Krishna; the puzzling sense that, despite all appearances to the
contrary, there is "nothing here that is not Zeus" in Aeschylus and
Sophocles; the terror caused by Dionysius in Euripides' Bacchae; the
refusal to cling even to concepts of "God" in order to become free to
experience Ultimate Reality as Emptiness in much Buddhist thought; the
moving declaration of that wondrous clarifier Thomas Aquinas, "All that I
have written is straw; I shall write no more"; Karl Rahner's insistence on
the radical incomprehensibility of both God and ourselves understood
through and in our most comprehensible philosophical and theological
speech; . . . the "God beyond God" language of Paul Tillich and all theologians who acknowledge how deadening traditional God-language can
easily become; the refusal to speak God's name in classical Judaism; the
insistence on speaking that name in classical Islam; the hesitant musings
on the present-absent God in Buber become the courageous attempts to
forge new languages for a new covenant with God in the post-tremendum
theologies of Cohen, Fackenheim, and Greenberg. There is no classic discourse on Ultimate Reality that can be understood as mastering its own
speech. If any human discourse gives true testimony to Ultimate Reality,
it must necessarily prove uncontrollable and unmasterable.
Id. Cf. MARTIN BUBER, HANS KONG, DOES GOD EXIST? AN ANSWER FOR TODAY 508

(Edward Quinn trans., 1980).
['God"] is the most loaded of all words used by men. None has been so
soiled, so mauled. But that is the very reason I cannot give it up. Generations of men have blamed this word for the burdens of their troubled
lives and crushed it to the ground; it lies in the dust, bearing all their
burdens. Generations of men with their religious divisions have torn the
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to insist with Aquinas that in talking about God we must either follow a via negativa or speak analogically is not to say
that God-talk is merely metaphorical or figurative or poetic.
Aquinas was, after all, a committed theological realist.66
To forestall predictable misunderstanding, let me make two

word apart; they have killed for it and died for it; it bears all their
fingerprints and is stained with all their blood. Where would I find a
word to equal it, to describe supreme reality? If I were to take the purest, most sparkling term from the innermost treasury of the philosophers,
I could capture in it no more than a noncommittal idea, not the presence
of what I mean, of what generations of men in the vastness of their
living and dying have venerated and degraded .. .. We must respect
those who taboo it, since they revolt against the wrong and mischief that
were so readily claimed to be authorized in the name of God; but we
cannot relinquish it. It is easy to understand why there are some who
propose a period of silence about the "last things," so that the misused
words may be redeemed. But this is not the way to redeem them. We
cannot clean up the term "God" and we cannot make it whole; but,
stained and mauled as it is, we can raise it from the ground and set it
above an hour of great sorrow.
Id. For feminist-theological reflection on God-talk, see generally JOHNSON, supra note
45; ROSEMARY R. RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK: TOWARD A FEMINIST THEOLOGY
(1983); WEAVING THE VISIONS: NEW PATI'ERNS IN FEMINIST SPIRITUALITY (J. Plaskow

& C. Christ eds., 1989) (of particular importance is part 2, "Naming the Sacred").
66. David Hollenbach, SJ, Afterword: A Community of Freedom, in CATHOLOCISM
AND LIBERALISM: CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (R. Douglass and

David Hollenbach, eds., (forthcoming).
For Christian believers, it is a challenge to recognize that their faith in
God and the way of life it entails is a historical reality-it is rooted in
historically particular scriptures and symbols and it is lived and sustained in historically particular communities. This historicity means that
the task of interpreting the meaning of their faith will never be done as
long as history lasts. The God in whom they place their faith can never
be identified with any personal relationship, social arrangement, or cultural achievement. God transcends all of these. Though Christians believe
that in Jesus Christ they have been given a definitive revelation of who
this God is, they cannot claim to possess or encompass God in any of
their theologies or understandings of the ultimate good of human life.
Thus, in the words of Avery Dulles, 'he Christian is defined as a person on the way to discovery, on the way to a revelation not yet given, or
at least not yet given in final form."
Id. (quoting Avery Dulles, Revelation and Discovery, in THEOLOGY AND DISCOvERY:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF KARL RAHNER 27 (Kelly, SJ ed., 1980). Hollenbach adds:
Because the Christian community is always on the way to the fullness of
its own deepest faith, hope, and love, it must be continually open to
fresh discoveries. Encounter with the other, the different, and the strange
must therefore characterize the life of the church. Active participation in
a community of freedom is a prerequisite to such discovery. Id. at 23.
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points. First, in presenting a religious version of the conviction
that every human being is sacred, I have relied on the religious
materials I know best. In relying primarily on Christian materials, however, I do not mean to suggest that there are not ample
materials in other religious traditions out of which one can
construct, or reconstruct, a relevantly similar version of the
conviction. Of course, just as there are differences among the
precise religious visions adhered to by different sects within
Christianity, there are differences among the precise visions
adhered to by different world religions. Again, the analogical
imagination does not yield precisely the same vision in every
time or place. But such differences ought not obscure the fact
that the experience of all human beings as sacred is widely
shared among different sects and religions, albeit expressed or
mediated differently in different traditions; and that common,
ecumenical ground helps to explain the emergence of the idea
of human rights as a point of convergence among peoples from
different religious traditions.6 7
Second, in presenting a religious version of the conviction
that every human being is sacred, and in relying primarily on
Christian materials in doing so, I do not mean to deny that the
lived practice, as distinct from the professed ideals of every
religious tradition, including Christianity, offers at best equivocal support for what we now call human rights. Indeed, I do
not mean to deny even that the professed ideals of religious
traditions-at least on some quite plausible construals of those
ideals-fail to support, and may even oppose, some of what we
now think of as human rights. Christianity is a conspicuous
example."5 There has been an obvious tendency on the part of

67. See WORLD RELIGIONS AND HUMAN LIBERATION (Dan Cohn-Sherbok ed., 1992);
THE ETHICS OF WORLD RELIGIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Hans King & Jiirgen Moltmann eds., 1990); HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS (Leroy Rouner ed.,
1988); HUMAN RIGHTS IN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS (Arlene Swidler ed., 1982); ROBERT
TRAER, FAITH IN HUMAN RIGHTS: SUPPORT IN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS FOR A GLOBAL
STRUGGLE (1991).
68. See SANDRA M. SCHNEIDERS, Does the Bible Have a Postmodern Message?, in
POSTMODERN THEOLOGY: CHRISTIAN FAITH IN A PLURALIST WORLD 56, 64-65 (Frederic

B. Barnham ed., 1989).
[There are] two problems: the ideological use of Scripture, which is, if
you will, an exterior problem; and the ideological content of Scripture,
which is intrinsic to the text.
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even the world's "great" religious traditions toward tribalism,
racism, and sexism. No person who takes seriously the resources of one or another religious tradition should deny "the
brokenness and ambiguity of every tradition" or repress "one's
own inevitably ambivalent relationship to [the tradition]." 9 A
self-critical attitude towards one's own tradition is "the route to
liberation from the negative realities of [the] tradition."0
For believers to be unable to learn from secular feminists
on the patriarchal nature of most religions or to be unwilling to be challenged by Feuerbach, Darwin, Marx, Freud, or
Nietzsche is to refuse to take seriously the religion's own
suspicions on the existence of those fundamental distortions
named sin, ignorance, or illusion. The interpretations of
believers will, of course, be grounded in some fundamental
trust in, and loyalty to, the Ultimate Reality both disclosed
and concealed in one's own religious tradition. But fundamental trust, as any experience of friendship can teach, is

not immune to either criticism or suspicion. A religious
person will ordinarily fashion some hermeneutics of trust,
even one of friendship and love, for the religious classics of
her or his tradition. But, as any genuine understanding of
The question of the use of Scripture for purposes of oppression is
being focused in the third-world struggle of the poor from domination by
the rich and for participation in the societies and cultures which have
been, for so long, controlled by the economically powerful for their own
advantage. The struggle involves wresting the sacred text from those who
have used it to legitimate their oppressive regimes and strategies and
delivering it into the hands of the oppressed as a resource for liberation ....

The problem of the ideological use of scripture is soluble and

is slowly being solved.
The second problem .

. . ,

that of the ideological content of Scripture,

is much more complicated. It is being focused in the struggle of women
for liberation from patriarchal oppression in family, society, and church,
and in the struggle of feminists, both men and women, to destroy the
patriarchal ideology which grounds not only sexism but racism, classism,
clericalism, and all the other forms of dualistic hierarchy in which the
powerful dominate the weak in the name of God. Here the problem is
not that the Scripture has been used to legitimate oppression (although
this is a continuing problem) but that the Bible itself is both a product
and a producer of oppression, that some of its content is oppressive.
Id. Schneiders' elaboration of the problem and her overview of the various responses
of women (especially feminist theologians) and others to it are excellent. Schneiders is
a feminist Christian theologian.
69. TRACY, supra note 25, at 105.
70. Id. at 100.
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friendship shows, friendship often demands both critique
and suspicion. A belief in a pure and innocent love is one of
the less happy inventions of the romantics. A friendship
that never includes critique and even, when appropriate,
suspicion is a friendship barely removed from the polite and
wary communication of strangers. As Buber showed, in
every I-Thou encounter, however transient, we encounter
some new dimension of reality. But if that encounter is to
prove more than transitory, the difficult ways of friendship
need a trust powerful enough to risk itself in critique and
suspicion. To claim that this may be true of all our other
loves but not true of our love for, and trust in, our religious
tradition makes very little sense either hermeneutically or
religiously.7

IV.
The religious-cosmological context of the conviction that every
human is sacred, the context I sketched in the preceding section, is not appealing to everyone. It was very unappealing to
Nietzsche. And even for one to whom it is greatly appealing, it
may not be credible. It is not credible, for example, to Jiirgen
Habermas, who has written:
[By confronting] the conscientious question about deliverance for the annihilated victims[,] we become aware of the
limits of that transcendence from within which is directed
to this world. But this does not enable us to ascertain the
countermovement of a compensating transcendence from beyond. That the universal covenant of fellowship would be
able to be effective retroactively, toward the past, only in
the weak medium of our memory ...

falls short of our

moral need. But the painful experience of a deficit is still
not a sufficient argument for the assumption of an "absolute freedom which saves in death. 7 2

71. Id. at 84-85, 86, 97-98, 112.
72. JORGEN HABERMAS, Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World, in
HABERMAS, MODERNITY, AND PUBLIC THEOLOGY 226, 238 (Don S. Browning & Francis
S. Fiorenza eds., 1992).

1993]

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGION

1051

Even if one finds incredible the religious-cosmological context
of the conviction that every human being is sacred, the question
persists whether the religious version of the conviction isn't the
only coherent version. Can there be a coherent secular version,
a version not finally rooted in a religious vision of the world
and of our place in it? Can the conviction be embedded either
in a nonreligious cosmology or in cosmological agnosticism?
Consider Glenn Tinder's statement:
Nietzsche's stature is owing to the courage and profundity that enabled him to make all this unmistakably clear.
He delineated with overpowering eloquence the consequences of giving up Christianity, and every like view of the uni-

verse and humanity. His approval of those consequences
and his hatred of Christianity give force to his argument.
Many would like to think that there are no consequences-that we can continue treasuring the life and welfare,
the civil rights and political authority, of every person without believing in a God who renders such attitudes and
conduct compelling. Nietzsche shows that we cannot. We
cannot give up the Christian God-and the transcendence
given other names in other faiths-and go on as before. We

must give up Christian morality too. If the God-man is
nothing more than an illusion, the same thing is true of the
idea that every individual possesses incalculable worth. The
standard of agape collapses. It becomes explicable only on

Nietzsche's terms: as a device by which the weak and failing exact from the strong and distinguished a deference
they do not deserve. Thus the spiritual center of Western
politics fades and vanishes.
Is Tinder right? We may agree with Charles Larmore that
morality is now widely understood (or, at least, understood by

73. Glenn Tinder, Can We Be Good without God: The Political Meaning of Christianity, THE ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Dec. 1989, at 69, 80 (passages rearranged and emphasis added). Tinder's emphasis on the Christian tradition will surely and understandably be, for some non-Christians, a provocative distraction from his fundamental
point. Tinder's (and Nietzsche's) point loses nothing, however, if the emphasis is
placed not on the Christian tradition but on the Jewish, for example. Recall the comment on the Talmud quoted earlier in this essay. Nor does the point lose anything if
the emphasis is put, for example, on the (Mahayana) Buddhist tradition, with its
insistence on compassion for all sentient creatures as the fitting response to the
true-as distinct from the illusory-nature of the world.
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many of us, religious or not, who read essays like this one) to
be independent of God conceived of as the supreme moral legislator.74 But is it plausible to think that morality can be independent of any cosmological convictions-any convictions about
how the world (including we-in-the-world) hangs together? After
Nietzsche, is it plausible to think that a morality embedded in
religious convictions about how the world hangs together can be
more or less equivalent to a morality embedded in the conviction that the world is nothing but a great cosmic process utterly bereft of ultimate meaning and therefore, from a human
point of view, absurd. 75 Nietzsche declared: "'Naivet6: as if morality could survive when the God who sanctions it is missing!
The 'beyond' absolutely necessary if faith in morality is to be
maintained."7 6 Writing recently of "anthropocentrism, [which]
by abolishing all horizons of significance, threatens us with a
loss of meaning and hence a trivialization of our predicament,"
Charles Taylor has said:
At one moment, we understand our situation as one of high
tragedy, alone in a silent universe, without intrinsic meaning, condemned to create value. But at a later moment, the
same doctrine, by its own inherent bent, yields a flattened
world, in which there aren't very meaningful choices because there aren't any crucial issues.77
Consider a cosmology according to which the world is, finally
and radically, meaningless-or, even if meaningful in some
sense, not meaningful in a way hospitable to our deepest yearn-

74. See Larmore, supra note 61.
75. Cf NIET-SCHE, supra note 21, at 169.
Man a little, eccentric species of animal, which-fortunately-has its day;

all on earth a mere moment, an incident, an exception without consequences, something of no importance to the general character of the
earth; the earth itself, like every star, a hiatus between two nothingness,
an event without plan, reason, will, self-consciousness, the worst kind of
necessity, stupid necessity--Something in us rebels against this view; the
serpent vanity says to us: "all that must be false, for it arouses indignation-Could all that not be merely appearance? And man, in spite of all,
as Kant says--"
Id. See also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOcIAL JUsTIcE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 368 (1980).

"There isno . ..meaning . . in the bowels of the universe."
76. NIETZSCHE, supra note 21, at 147.
77. CHARLEs TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 68 (1991).
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ings for what Heschel called "ultimate relationship, ultimate
belonging.""8 Consider, for example, Clarence Darrow's bleak
vision, as recounted by Paul Edwards:
Darrow, one of the most compassionate men who ever
lived, ... concluded that life was an "awful joke."...
Darrow offered as one of his reasons the apparent aimless-

ness of all that happens. "This weary old world goes on,
begetting, with birth and with living and with death," he
remarked in his moving plea for the boy-murderers Loeb
and Leopold, "and all of it is blind from the beginning to

the end." Elsewhere he wrote: "Life is like a ship on the
sea, tossed by every wave and by every wind; a ship headed

for no port and no harbor, with no rudder, no compass, no
pilot; simply floating for a time, then lost in the waves." In
addition to the aimlessness of life and the universe, there is
the fact of death. "I love my friends," wrote Darrow, "but

they all must come to a tragic end." Death is more terrible
the more one is attached to things in the world. Life, he
concludes, is "not worthwhile," and he adds ... that "it is

an unpleasant interruption of nothing, and the best thing

you can say of it is that it does not last long."79

One prominent contemporary proponent of a Darrowian cosmology, the physicist (and Nobel laureate) Steven Weinberg,
"finds his own world-view 'chilling and impersonal'. He cannot

understand people who treat the absence of God and of God's
heaven as' unimportant.""° Where is the place in a cosmologi78. See JOSKE, supra note 23, at 250 ("If, as Kurt Vonnegut speculates in The

Sirens of Titan, the ultimate end of human activity is the delivery of a small piece of

steel to a wrecked space ship wanting to continue a journey of no importance whatsoever, the end would be too trivial to justify the means;") see also Nozick, supra note
54 at 586.
If the cosmic role of human beings was to provide a negative lesson to
some others ('don't act like them') or to provide needed food to passing
intergalactic travelers who were important, this would not suit our aspirations-not even if afterwards the intergalactic travelers smacked their
lips and said that we tasted good.
Id.
79. Paul Edwards, Life, Meaning and Value of, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHM. 467,
470 (Paul Edwards ed:, 1967). Whether Clarence Darrow was in fact "one of the most
compassionate men who ever lived" is open to serious question. For a revisionist view
of Darrow, see GARY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS, chs. 8-9

(1990).
80. John Leslie, Is It All Quite Simple? The Physicist's Search for a Theory of Ev-
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cal view like Weinberg's for the conviction that every human
being is sacred (has inherent dignity, is an end in himself, etc.)
to gain a foothold? Indeed, embedded in the view that the
world is merely a process devoid of ultimate meaning, what
would the conviction that every human being is sacred even
mean? If the only coherent version of the conviction is religious-if indeed the only intelligible version is religious-then
cosmological agnosticism, which neither affirms nor denies the
ultimate meaningfulness of the world, entails agnosticism about
the sacredness vel non of human beings.
In writing recently about abortion and euthanasia, Ronald
Dworkin has asserted that "[w]e almost all accept, as the inarticulate assumption behind much of our experience and conviction, that human life in all its forms is sacred.""' Dworkin
then observes that "[flor some of us, [the sacredness of human
life] is a matter of religious faith; for others, of secular but
deep philosophical belief."12 Now, many folks who believe that
every human being is sacred do not count themselves religious;
some of them even embrace nonreligious views like Weinberg's.
The question nonetheless persists whether there is a coherent
secular version of the conviction about the sacredness of every
human being. Imagine a nonreligious person saying: "That
erything, Times Literary Supp., Jan. 29, 1993, at 3 (reviewing, inter alia, STEVEN
WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY (1992)); ef. Paul Davies, The Holy Grail of
Physics, NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REV., Mar. 7, 1993, at 11 (reviewing, inter alia,
Weinberg's book) (Reductionism [in physics] may be a fruitful research method, but it
is a bleak philosophy ....
If the world is but a collection of inert atoms interacting
through blind and purposeless forces, what happens to ... the meaning of life?).
For a controversial critique of such scientific reductionism, see B. APPLEYARD,
UNDERSTANDING THE PRESENT: SCIENCE AND THE SOUL OF MODERN MAN (1992). On
philosophical inquiry into cosmology, see Derek Parfit, The Puzzle of Reality, TIMES
LITERARY SuPp., July 3, 1992, at 3.
Several papers in a fierce and ongoing debate about the consistency or inconsistency of claims made in evolutionary biology with Christian claims are relevant here.
All the papers are by persons who identify themselves as Christians. In the September 1991 issue of Christian Scholar's Review, see Ernan McMullin, Platinga'sDefense
of Special Creation; A. Platinga, Evolution, Neutrality, and Antecedent Probability:A
Reply to McMullin and Van Till; A. Platinga, When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible; Howard J. Van Till, When Faith and Reason Cooperate. In the
June/July 1993 issue of First Things, see Howard J. Van Till & P. Johnson, God and
Evolution: An Exchange.
81. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 36.
82. Id. at 36.
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every human being is sacred is not, for me, a religious tenet; it
is a secular but deep philosophical belief." We may ask: "Please
tell us something about the constellation of views-views about
how the world, including we-in-the-world, hangs together-in
which, for you, that philosophical belief is embedded." Imagine
this answer: "For me the conviction that every human being is
sacred is not only axiomatic; it is unconnected to any of my
views about how the world hangs together." Perhaps the answer includes this statement: "I have no confident views about
how the world hangs together. I'm agnostic about all such 'religious' or 'cosmological' matters." It seems, then, that the premise that every human being is sacred is, for our nonreligious
interlocutor, less a conviction about a part of the world than a
kind of free-floating aesthetic preference. In Dworkin's view,
however, the premise is, even for most nonreligious persons
who hold it, much more than an aesthetic preference.
In his book on abortion and euthanasia, Dworkin writes that
"one of [his] main claims [is] that there is a secular as well as
a religious interpretation of the idea that human life is
sacred." 3 Dworkin purports to explain, in his book, how the
conviction that every human being or "life," is sacred "may be,
and commonly is, interpreted in a secular as well as in a conventionally religious way."' To say that a human life is
83. RONALD DwORKiN, LIFE's DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 195 (1993).
84. Id. at 25. Curiously, elsewhere in his book Dworkin writes that he "can think
of no plausible account of the content that a belief must have in order to be deemed
religious that would rule out convictions about why and how human life [is sacred],
except the abandoned notion that religious belief must presuppose a god." Id. at 163.
He also says that "why and how human life is sacred" is an "essentially religious position." Id. at 165. It is not obvious why, if there is a secular interpretation or version of the idea that human life is sacred, the issue of why and how human life is
sacred is essentially religious. If the idea that human life is sacred is not essentially
religious, why is the issue of why and how human life is sacred essentially religious?
Dworkin's principal incentive to claim that the idea that human life is sacred can be
interpreted in a secular as well as in a religious way is that, for purposes of his
characterization of the abortion controversy, he wants to be able to attribute the idea,
in its secular version, to secular folks, as well as, in its religious version, to religious
ones. His principal incentive to claim that the issue of why and how human life is
sacred is essentially religious is that, for purposes of his argument about the (un)constitutionality of restrictive abortion legislation, Dworkin wants to be able to rely on
the constitutional premise according to which government may not take coercive action predicated on nothing more than a contested position on an essentially religious
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sacred is partly to say, according to Dworkin, "that it has intrinsic and objective value quite apart from any value it might
have to the person whose life it is."85 Emphasizing in particular the notion of "intrinsic" value, Dworkin writes:
[Miuch of our life is based on the idea that objects or
events can be valuable in themselves ....[Tihe idea that
some events or objects are valuable in and of
themselves . . . is . . . a

familiar

part

of

our

experience .... The idea of intrinsic value is commonplace,

and it has a central place in our shared scheme of values
and opinions ....

Something is intrinsically valuable... if

its value is independent of what people happen to enjoy or
want or need or what is good for them.86
Dworkin's comments about "intrinsic" value obscure rather
than clarify that value is always and everywhere value for
someone or something. The notion of something being valuable
independently of a beneficial relation to anyone or anything-whether a human being, a nonhuman but living entity,
or God-is perfectly opaque. Putting aside things that are of
value either for nonhuman entities or for God, we may say that
the category of values is anthropocentric, in that it corresponds to interests which can only take root in creatures
with something approaching our own affective makeup .... [VIalues are only ascribable from points of view
constituted by human patterns of affective response. A
wholly dispassionate eye would be as blind to them as a
black-and-white camera to chromatic colors.87

issue. See id. at 160-68 (suggesting that whether there is such a constitutional premise is open to question). Cf. Michael Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice:
Further Thoughts--and Second Thoughts--on Love and Power, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
000 (forthcoming 1993).
85. DWORKIN supra note 83, at 36 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 69-71.

87. A. Price, "Varieties of Objectivity and Values," Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 103, 106 (1983). See DAviD HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.

Selby-Bigge ed., 1973):
Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and
cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects,
but perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in morals, like that other
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The relevant distinction here is between "intrinsic" value and
"instrumental" value. To say that something has intrinsic value
is to say, not that something has value even if it has no value
for anyone (not even God) or anything-but that something has
value for someone (or something) not merely as a means to an
end but as an end in itself. And to say that something has
"objective" value and not (or not merely) "subjective" value is to

in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; tho', like that, too, it has little or no influence on
practice.
See also Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment on Dean Clark, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1748,
1755 (1989):
[The view] that there are goods which are not the goods of any human
beings at all, is likely to appear... wholly unintelligible, for it conflicts
with what is perhaps the deepest and most widely shared orthodoxy of
modem moral thought-the assumption that only the goods of human
beings (or perhaps sentient beings) count in assessing different practices
and institutions.
Cf. Robin W. Lovin, Empiricism and Christian Social Thought, ANNuAL OF SOCIETY
OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 25, 41 (1982): "Ethics will never be like physics, chemistry, or
certain types of sociology, because it understands the moral reality to be about an
interaction between persons and the world which can only be known from the reports
of those who experience that interaction."
Does Dworkin disagree? It's difficult to tell. Cf. Dworkin, supra note 83, at 248
n.1.

I do not mean to take any position on a further, very abstract philosophical issue not pertinent to this discussion: whether great paintings would
still be valuable if intelligent life were altogether destroyed forever so
that no one could ever have the experience of regarding paintings again.
There is no inconsistency in denying that they would have value then,
because the value of a painting lies in the kind of experience it makes
available, while still insisting that this value is intrinsic because it does
not depend on any creatures' actually wanting that kind of experience.
Id. At one point in his discussion of "intrinsic" value, Dworkin writes: "David Hume
and many other philosophers insisted that objects or events can be valuable only
when and because they serve someone's or something's interests. On this view, nothing is valuable unless someone wants it or unless it helps someone get what he does
want." Id. at 69. The second sentence here is a glaring non sequitur. It does not
follow, from the Humean view, that nothing is valuable unless someone wants it or
unless it helps someone get what he does want. It follows only that nothing is valuable unless it serves someone's or something's interests. That something serves my
interests does not entail that I want it, or that it helps me get what I do want.
After all, I may not know that something serves my interests, or I may not know
what my real interests are. Indeed, that I want something, or that it helps me get
what I do want, does not entail that it serves my interests; I may want things that
are not good for me-indeed, that are bad for me.
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say that something has value for someone (for example, that it
is good for her, that it is conducive to or perhaps even constitutive of her flourishing) even if she is unaware that it has value
for her-indeed, even if she believes that it has disvalue for
88
her.
That something has both objective and intrinsic value for
someone does not mean that it is sacred. An end to my itch has
both objective and intrinsic value for me but it is not thereby
sacred. For some persons who count themselves religious, to say
that every human being is sacred is to say, speaking analogically, that every human being is the beloved child of God (God
who is love). For persons who do not count themselves
religious, what does it mean to say that every human being is
sacred?
According to Dworkin, "[t]he nerve of the sacred lies in the
value we attach to a process or enterprise or project rather
than to its results considered independently from how they
were produced."8 9 Dworkin argues, the sacredness of human
beings is rooted, for nonreligious persons, in two basic facts
about human beings. First, every human being is "the highest
product of natural creation ....
[The idea that human beings
are special among natural creations is offered to explain why it
is horrible that even a single human individual life should be
extinguished." ° Second, "each developed human being is the
product not just of natural creation, but also of the kind of
deliberative human creative force that we honor in honoring
art."9 "The idea that each individual human life is inviolable
is therefore rooted ... in two combined and intersecting bases
of the sacred: natural and human creation."9 2

88. To say that something has merely subjective value for someone, is to say that
she believes it to have value for her even though it does not. Considered in isolation,
something may have objective and/or subjective value for someone even if considered
in context it does not. One thing that has value for someone may crowd out or preclude another thing that has even greater value for her.
89. DWORKIN, supra note 83, at 78.
90: Id. at 82. See also id. at 81-84.
91. Id. at 82.
92. Id. at 83.
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The life of a single human organism commands respect
and protection, then, no matter in what form or shape,
because of the complex creative investment it represents
and because of our wonder at the.., processes that produce new lives from old ones, at the processes of nation and
community and language through which a human being will
come to absorb and continue hundreds of generations of
cultures and forms of life and value, and, finally, when
mental life has begun and flourishes, at the process of internal personal creation and judgment by which a person
will make and remake himself, a mysterious, inescapable
'process in which we each participate, and which is therefore
the most powerful and inevitable source of empathy and
communion we have with every other creature who faces
the same frightening challenge. The horror we feel in the
willful destruction of a human life reflects our shared inarticulate sense of the intrinsic
importance of each of these
93
dimensions of investment.
This, then, is Dworkin's rendering of a secular version of the
conviction that every human being is sacred. Even if in truth
the world is nothing but a process bereft of ultimate meaning,
every human being is nonetheless sacred, according to Dworkin,
because "each human being ... is a creative masterpiece94--a
masterpiece of "natural and human creation."95
Does Dworkin succeed in portraying a coherent secular version of the conviction that every human being is sacred? Important questions need to be answered-or so it seems to me. How
does the fact that something is a masterpiece of natural and
human creation make that something not merely a creative
masterpiece, but sacred? What is the precise sense of "sacred"
at play in Dworkin's portrayal? Let us agree that every human
being is a creative masterpiece and, as such, inspires awe in
us. That something justifiably inspires awe in us, however--James Joyce's Ulysses, for example-entails neither that
we believe it to be sacred, nor that it is sacred.

93. Id. at 84.
94. Id. at 82.

95. Id. at 83.
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To say that every human being is sacred, and therefore inviolable, is ordinarily to say something about (what is believed to
be) the true nature of every human being. Of course, something
may inspire awe in us, and we may therefore value it-it may
have both objective and intrinsic value for us-because it is sacred (or, at least, because we believe it to be sacred). But to
suggest, as Dworkin does in his book that something is sacred
because it inspires awe in us, because we value it, is to reverse
the ordinary order of things.96 Dworkin seems to be using "sacred" in what we may call a weak, or "subjective,"
sense-something (e.g. a human life) is sacred because, or in the
sense that, it inspires awe in us and we attach great value to
it-rather than in the strong, or "objective," sense-something
is sacred and therefore it inspires awe in us and we attach
great value to it. Moreover, in using "sacred" in the weak or
subjective sense, Dworkin is trading on the greater strength of
the objective sense in which the word is ordinarily used.
That rhetorical strategy, however, is problematic. The premise that every human being is sacred-in-the-subjective-sense
cannot begin to bear the weight of the premise that every human being is sacred-in-the-objective-sense. Imagine someone
saying to a Bosnian Serb: "The Bosnian Muslim, too, no less
than you, is sacred. It is wrong for you to rape her." If "sacred"
is meant in the subjective sense, the Bosnian Serb may reply:
"Sacred to you and yours, perhaps, but not to me and mine. In
the scheme of things, .we happen not to attach much value to
her life." By contrast, "sacred" in the objective sense is not
fundamentally a matter of "sacred to you" or "sacred to me." It
is, rather, a matter of how things really are. (Of course, one
may disbelieve the ontology, but that's a different problem.) If
every human being is sacred in the objective sense, then, in
violating the Bosnian Muslim, the Bosnian Serb does not mere-

96. Id. at 78. Recall, for example, Dworkin's statement that "the nerve of the sacred lies in the value we attach to a process or enterprise or project rather than to
its results considered independently from how they were produced." Id. Or his statement that "[t]he life of a single human organism commands respect and protection . . .because of our wonder at the . . . processes that produce new lives from old
ones . . . ") Id. at 71.
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ly violate what some of us attach great value to; he violates the
very order of creation.
Dworkin may insist that he's been misunderstood. He may
insist that he means "sacred" in the objective sense, and that
on his account of "sacred," the Bosnian Serb is indeed violating
the very order of creation. He may say that the Bosnian Muslim has intrinsic value even for the Bosnian Serb-and objective value too; that the welfare of the Bosnian Muslim is an
intrinsic good for the Bosnian Serb, even if the Bosnian Serb
will remain forever unaware of that fact. But if Dworkin wants
to respond in such a way, then he must forswear any explanation of the sacredness of someone or something in terms of, or
by reference to, "the value we attach to" that someone or something. He must explain it solely in other terms. It is not clear,
however, what those other terms might be. In particular, it is
not obvious that either a secular cosmology or cosmological
agnosticism can yield the requisite conviction about how things
really are. How do we get from "the universe is, or might be,
nothing but a cosmic process bereft of ultimate meaning" to
"every human being is nonetheless sacred in the strong or objective sense"? Of course, even in an absurd universe, a universe bereft of transcendent meaning, there can be creative
masterpieces. But again, that something is a creative masterpiece and understandably inspires awe in us entails neither
that it is sacred nor even that we believe it to be sacred in the
strong sense.
Has Dworkin identified a coherent secular version of the
conviction that every human being is sacred? It seems not, if
"sacred" is meant in the objective sense; however, if "sacred" is
meant in the subjective sense, perhaps Dworkin has. But if he
has, Dworkin's secularized claim that every human being is
sacred is a substantially weaker claim than the paradigmatic
claim about the sacredness of all human beings. In any event,
Dworkin has said nothing to diminish suspicion that the conviction that every human being is sacred-sacred in the
strong/objective sense, sacred because of how the world really is,
and not because of what we attach value to in the world-is
inescapably religious. The challenge is to identify a coherent
secular version of that conviction. In his review of Dworkin's
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book for the Times Literary Supplement, Robert Grant concluded that "[in Life's Dominion, Professor Dworkin makes considthe idea of the sacred,
erable play with, indeed frankly exploits,
97

but shows no understanding of it."
V.

If-if-the conviction that every human being is sacred is

inescapably religious, it follows that the idea of human rights is
ineliminably religious, because the conviction is an essential,
even foundational, constituent of the idea. The possibility that
the idea of human rights is ineliminably religious poses a problem for the secular or agnostic enthusiast of human rights. One
response to the problem is to try to defend the establishment in
international law of the particular human rights, or of some of
them, that have in fact been established in international law
during the last fifty years, not by relying on the conviction that
every human being is sacred. Rather, human rights can be
defended by means of a justificatory strategy that avoids reliance on that conviction-a strategy that avoids reliance, therefore, on "the idea of human rights." I now want to identify and
comment briefly on two such strategies.9"

97. Robert Grant, Abortion and the Idea of the Sacred, TIMES LITERARY SuPP., June
18, 1993, at 11.
98. There are, of course, others. A prominent secular argument for human
rights-that is, a prominent argument that does not rely on the possibly ineliminably
religious idea of human rights-is Alan Gewirth's. See ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS
41-78 (1982); ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, chs. 1-2 (1978); Alan Gewirth,
Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN
DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 10 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds.,
1992). Alan Gewirth, The Epistemology of Human Rights, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY, Spring 1984, at 1. Gewirth's argument has been extremely controversial, to say
the least. Indeed, I am tempted to say that there is as close to a consensus as one
gets in moral philosophy that Gewirth's argument simply doesn't work. See, e.g., BRIAN M. BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE 285-88 (1989). GEWIRTi'S ETHICAL RATIONALISM
(Edward Regis, Jr., ed., 1984); For a careful restatement and defense of Gewirth's argument, see DERYCK BEYLEVELD, THE DIALECTICAL NECESSITY OF MORALITY: AN ANALYSIS AND DEFENSE OF ALAN GEWIRTH'S ARGUMENT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF GENERIC
CONSISTENCY (1991). For a skeptical review of Beyleveld's book, see Nick Fotion, 103
Ethics 579 (1993) (book review).
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The Definitional Strategy
[Tihere is today no way of proving that napalming babies is
bad except by asserting it (in a louder and louder voice), or
by defining it as so, early in one's game, and then later
slipping it through, in a whisper, as a conclusion."

The idea of human rights, again, is that because each and
every human being is, simply as a human being, sacred, certain
things ought not to be done to any human being and certain
other things ought to be done for every human being. The definitional strategy is a different way of trying to ground this
proposition so as not to rely on the premise that human beings
are sacred. According to the definitional strategy, certain things
ought not to be done and certain other things ought to be done
simply because "the moral point of view"--understood as the
"impartial" or "universal" point of view-requires it. In commenting on "that sort of impartiality that constitutes the moral
point of view," James Griffin has written that
[wie all agree that to look at things morally is to look at
them, in some sense or other, impartially, granting every
person some sort of equal status. Of course, we should have
to make this notion of equal status more determinate-say
through one interpretation or other of the Ideal Observer or
Ideal Contractor. In any case, principles of equality can be
principles of impartiality in this sense: they can express the
spirit with which one will, if one is moral, consider the
facts of the matter.0 0
The definitional strategy is deeply problematic, because it
fails even to address what David Tracy has called the "limitquestion" of morality: "Why be moral at all?"'0 ' The

99. Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
VA. L. REV. 451, 454 (1974) (emphasis added).
100. JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING 239 (1986).
101. David Tracy, Theology, Critical Social Theory, and the Public Realm, in HABERMAS, MODERNITY, AND PUBLIc THEOLOGY, 19, 37 (Don S. Browning & Francis S. Fiorenza eds., 1992).
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strategy fails to respond to this fundamental

You claim that we ought not to do certain things to any
human being, and that we ought to do certain other things
for every human being. We ask why. You say that the moral (impartial, universal) point of view requires it. For the
sake of argument we will stipulate to your definition of
"moral." Our challenge remains, but now we'll express it
this way: Why ought we to adopt "the moral point of view";
why ought we to be "moral" in the stipulated sense? Why
ought we to give a damn about being "moral" or doing the
"moral" thing? We are right back where we started: What
reasons-what real-world, flesh-and-blood reasons-are
there for doing for every human being those certain things
that the moral point of view requires be done for every
human being and for not doing to any human being those
certain other things that the moral point of view forbids be
done to any human being?
The fundamental challenge to each and every human rights
claim, about what ought not to be done to any human being or
what ought to be done for every human being, is a demand for
reasons. James Nickel has distinguished between two different
interpretations of the demand: one according to which it is "a
demand for prudential reasons," and another according to which
it is "a request for moral reasons."" 2 The second interpreta-

102. JAMES NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS
ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 91 (1987). (The distinction be-

tween "prudential" and "moral" is deeply problematic, at least for anyone with an
Aristotelian understanding of morality). See Stephen Scott, Motive and Justification,
85 J. PHIL. 479, 499 (1988).
When he was deliberating about how to live, St. Augustine asked, "What
does anything matter, if it does not have to do with happiness?" His
question requires. explanation, because he is not advising selfishness nor
the reduction of other people to utilities, and even qualification, because
other things can have some weight. All the same, the answer he expects
is obviously right: only a happy life matters conclusively. If I had a clear
view of it, I could have no motive to decline it, I could regret nothing by
accepting it, I would have nothing about which to deliberate further.
Cf. Richard Taylor, Ancient Wisdom and Modern Folly, 13 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 54,
57-58 (1988).
The Greek eudainoniais always translated "happiness," which is unfortunate, for the meaning we attach to the word happiness is thin indeed
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tion, Nickel suggests, "assumes that one's audience has transcended egoism and is prepared to accept arguments that appeal directly to what is reasonable from the moral point of
view, whether or not it can be shown that adopting this perspective is likely to promote the long-term interests of the individual."' But the problem is larger, much larger, than "egoism." One may favor, not oneself, or even one's family, but one's
tribe, or nation, or race, or religion. The assumption that those
to whom human rights claims are addressed have "transcended"
such favoritism is wildly implausible. The fundamental challenge to human rights claims is a real-world challenge. Many to
whom such claims are addressed have conspicuously not adopted anything like "the moral (impartial, universal) point of
view." The moral point of view is not a justificatory basis for
human rights claims-at least, not a fundamental basis. The
moral point of view is itself in dire need of justification, especially in a world--our world, the real world-that is often
fiercely partial/local rather than impartial/universal. The real
world is full of what Primo Levi called "us-ism":
Those on the Rosenstrasse who risked their lives for Jews
did not express opposition to anti-semitic policies per se.
They displayed primarily what the late Primo Levi, a survivor of Auschwitz, called "selfishness extended to the person
closest to you ...

us-ism." In most of the stories that I

have heard of Aryans who risked their lives for Jews to
whom they were married, they withdrew to safety, one by
one, the moment their loved ones were released. Their protests bring home to 4us the iron limits, the tragically narrow
borders, of us-ism.'0

compared to what the ancients meant by eudaimonia. Fulfillment might

be a better translation, though this, too, fails to capture the richness of
the original term .... The concept of happiness in modern philosophy,

as well as in popular thinking, is superficial indeed in comparison.
Id.
For an extended discussion of the "Why be moral?" problem from a neo-Aristotelian perspective, see RODIGER BrrTNER, WHAT REASON DEMANDS (Theodore Talbot
trans. Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
103. Nickel, supra note 102 at 91.
104. Nathan Stoltzfus, Dissent in Nazi Germany, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Sept. 1992, at
87, 94.
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The question remains: what reasons are there for adopting
"the moral point of view"? Charles Taylor, commenting critically
on moral theories that are variations on the definitional strategy-in particular, theories that exclude discourse about human
well-being-has put the point this way:
[Such theories] leave us with nothing to say to someone
who asks why he should be moral ....
But this could be
misleading, if we seemed to be asking how we could convince someone who saw none of the point of our moral
beliefs. There is nothing we can do to "prove" we are right
to such a person. But imagine him to be asking another
question: he could be asking us to make plain the point of
our moral code, in articulating what's uniquely valuable in
cleaving to these injunctions [e.g., act "impartially"]. Then
the implication of these theories is that we have nothing to

say which can impart insight. We can wax rhetorical and
propagandize, but we can't say what's good or valuable
about [the injunctions], or why they command assent." 5

105. Taylor, supra note 23, at 87. Compare the following excerpt:
Much contemporary moral philosophy, particularly but not only in the
English-speaking world, has given such a narrow focus to morality ....
This moral philosophy has tended to focus on what it is right to do rather than on what it is good to be, on defining the content of obligation
rather than the nature of the good life .....
This philosophy has accredited a cramped and truncated view of morality in a narrow sense, as
well as of the whole range of issues involved in the attempt to live the
best possible life, and this not only among professional philosophers, but
with a wider public.
Id. at 3, Taylor's book is, among other things, a powerful argument for a different,
larger understanding of "moral;" an Aristotelian rather than a Kantian understanding.
See id. at 4, 14-15, 63-64, 79, 87.
The effort to evade the why-be-moral question by distinguishing between "reasons" and "motives" is unavailing as, indeed, is implicit in Taylor's comments. See
Henry B. Veatch, Modern Ethics, Theology, and Love of Self, 75 THE MONIST 52, 60
(1992).
[Tihe stock answer given to this question has long been one of trying to
distinguish between a reason and a motive for being moral. For surely, it
is argued, if I recognize something to be my duty, then surely I have a
reason to perform the required action, even though I have no motive for
performing it. In fact, even to ask for a motive for doing something,
when one already has a reason for doing it, would seem to be at once
gratuitous and unnecessary-at least so it is argued. Unhappily, though,
the argument has a dubious air about it at best. For does it amount to
anything more than trying to prove a point by first attempting to make
a distinction, implying that the distinction is no mere distinction, but a
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The definitional strategy is unavailing. Of course, a strategy
is not definitional if it explains "the moral point of view" on the
basis of a cosmological vision that yields something like the
premise that every human being is sacred. But then we are
back to the question of whether such a premise isn't inescapably religious."'

distinction with a difference-viz, the distinction between a reason and a
motive. But then, having exploited the distinction, and yet at the same
time insinuating that one might conceivably have a reason for doing
something, but no motive for doing it, the argument draws to its conclusion by surreptitiously taking advantage of the fact that there possibly is
no real distinction between a reason and a motive after all, so that if
one has a reason for doing a thing, then one has a motive for doing it
as well. In other words, it's as if the argument only succeeds by taking
back with its left hand what it had originally given with its right.
Id.
106. John Finnis' argument in defense of a requirement "of fundamental impartiality
among the human subjects who are or may be partakers of [basic human goods]" is
simply unavailing. For the argument, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL

RIGHTS 106-09 (1980).
[John] Finnis has tried to do in two pages what ... others have devoted
entire books to: the attempt to show that egoism is inherently self-contradictory or irrational. All of these attempts have failed. It is surprising
that Finnis deals with such a problematic and contentious issue in such
a brief and casual fashion.
J.D. Goldsworthy, God or Mackie: The Dilemma of Secular Moral Philosophy, 30
Ai. J. JURIs. 43, 75 (1985).
One of Finnis' most recent writings fares no better. See John Finnis, Natural Law
and Legal Reasoning, in Robert P. George ed., NATURAL LAW THEORY 134 (1992).
Given the current prominence in some circles of Habermasian "discourse ethics,"
this recent statement by Jtirgen Habermas is worth reporting-a statement that
should be very sobering for anyone who thinks that discourse ethics is an effective
secular argument for human rights. He states: "It is true that a philosophy that
thinks postmetaphysically cannot answer the question that [David] Tracy... calls
attention to: why be moral at all?" HABERMAS, supra note 72, at 239.
What Habermas then goes on to say is really quite remarkable, if not incredible.
At the same time, however, this philosophy can show why this question
does not arise meaningfully for communicatively socialized individuals.
We acquire our moral intuitions in our parents' home, not in school. And
moral insights tell us that we do not have any good reasons for behaving
otherwise: for this, no self-surpassing of morality is necessary. It is true
that we often behave otherwise, but we do so with a bad conscience. The
first half of the sentence attests to the weakness of the motivational
power of good reasons; the second half attests that rational motivation by
reasons is more than nothing [auch nicht nichts ist]-moral convictions do
not allow themselves to be overridden without resistance.
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The Self-Regarding Strategy

The self-regarding strategy is yet another way, one that does
not rely on anything like the premise that human beings are
sacred, of trying to justify the proposition that certain things
ought not to be done to any human being, and certain other
things ought to be done for every human being. According to
the self-regarding strategy, it is good for oneself or for one's
family, tribe, nation, race, religion, etc., that certain things not
be done to any human being, and certain other things be done
for every human being. This strategy needs to be distinguished
from (lest it collapse into) the different (and ineliminably religious?) strategy according to which every human being is sacred, and it is good for everyone to recognize that fact and act
accordingly. According to the self-regarding strategy, it is good
for oneself or for one's nation/etc. that certain things not be
done and certain other things be done, even if it is not the case
that every human being is sacred.
The fundamental problem with the self-regarding strategy is
twofold. First, it is not clear how much more than "a mere
nonaggression treaty"'0 7 -a treaty among persons who have
reason to fear one another-the self-regarding strategy can
support. A recent, prominent self-regarding strategy is David
Gauthier's contractarian argument. Let's put aside the question
whether the argument works and look simply at the aim of the
argument, which, according to Gauthier, is to show "that rational persons will recognize a role for constraints, both unilateral
and mutual, in their choices and decisions, that rational persons would agree ex ante on certain mutual constraints were

Id.
Let's put aside the fact that "we" acquire our moral "intuitions" in many places
besides our parents' home. The more important point, for present purposes, is that
we do not all acquire the same moral intuitions. Some of us acquire moral intuitions
that enable us to ignore, and perhaps even to brutalize, the Other without any pangs
of "conscience." It is incredible that, in the waning days of this unbearably brutal
century, Habermas (writing in Germany of all places) could suggest otherwise. We
need not even look at the oppressors themselves; we need look only at those whose
passivity makes them complicitors-as the quote in the text accompanying the preceding note confirms.
107. See WILLIAMS, supra note 54, at 103-04.
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they able to do so, and that rational persons will frequently
08
comply with those mutual constraints in their interactions."
In particular, Gauthier's self-regarding argument does not aim
to justify anything close to the range of rights established in
international law-for example, in the International Bill of
Human Rights. As one commentator has observed, "[Gauthier's]
main interest is to give an account of rational and impartial
constraints on conduct. If this does not capture the traditional
conception of morality, so much the worse for the traditional
conception. Rationality-not morality-is the important notion
for him." 10 9
Second, whatever rights beyond "a mere nonaggression treaty" the self-regarding strategy can support, it is not clear that
the strategy can support them as human rights-as rights each
and every human being should enjoy. It may be able to support
them only as rights among persons who have reason to fear one
another's aggression or to need one another's cooperation. Nietzsche wrote:
Justice (fairness) originates among those who are approximately equally powerful, as Thucydides ... comprehended
correctly... [Jiustice is repayment and exchange on the
assumption of an approximately equal power position ....
Justice naturally derives from prudent concern with selfpreservation; that means, from the egoism of the consideration: "Why should I harm
myself uselessly and perhaps not
110
attain my goal anyway?"
Even if you are not within the circle of those I happen to respect and for whom I happen to have concern, if you are my
neighbor, I may have reason to fear your aggression or to need
your cooperation. But if you are a Somalian, or a Bosnian Mus-

108. David Gauthier, Rational Constraint: Some Last Words, in CONTRACTARIANISM
AND RATIONAL CHOICE: ESSAYS ON DAVID GAUTHIER'S Morals by Agreement 323, 330
(Peter Vallentyne ed., 1991).
109. Peter Vallentyne, Gauthier's Three Projects, in CONTRACTARIANISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE: ESSAYS ON DAVID GAUTHEIR'S Morals by Agreement (Peter Vallentyne
ed., 1991).
110. Friedrich Nietzsche, All Too Human, in BASIC WRITINGS OF NIETScHE 148 (W.
Kaufmann trans., 1973).
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lim, we (as North Americans) may not have any realistic reason
to fear your aggression or to need your cooperation.
On the other hand, even if you are only a lowly inhabitant of
an alien, distant, and weak community, we or some of those
within the circle of our respect and concern may eventually
suffer in ways not always easy to predict or even foresee if we
fail to act toward you as if you were within the circle of our respect and concern. Although, again, their principal justificatory
reliance is on the idea of human rights-their principal argument is other-regarding. Even the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights"' and the other documents of the International Bill of Human Rights 112 contain at least a hint of a selfregarding argument, namely: if you want to enjoy the fruits of
peace in the world, you must extend your respect and concern
to all human beings. Each of the three documents of the International Bill of Rights states in its preamble that "recognition ... of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world.""' Similarly, the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" 4 states that the "Fundamental Freedoms" 1 5 it
affirms "are the foundation of justice and peace in the
world." 6
As a matter of domestic political debate-as a matter of domestic realpolitik-plausible self-regarding ("pragmatic") reasons
for our nation taking even the lowliest of the low into the circle
of those it happens to respect and for whom it happens to have
concern are undoubtedly an important complement to the otherregarding argument (i.e., the idea of human rights) for our
nation doing so.ll' (I quote Jerome Shestack's useful catalogue

111. See supra note 7.
112. See supra notes 7, 10 & 11.
113. See supra notes 7, 10 & 11 at pmbl. (emphasis added).
114. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950) 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1953).
115. Id. at pmbl.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Cf. Henry Kissinger, Continuity and Change in American Foreign Policy, SOCIETY NovlDec. 1977 at 97, 99.
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of such reasons below.)" 8 It seems quite doubtful, however,
[Olne of the basic challenges of foreign policy [is] the perennial tension
between morality and pragmatism. Whenever it has been forced to wield
its great power, the United States has also been driven to search its conscience. How does our foreign policy serve moral ends? How can the
United States carry out its role as human example and champion of
justice in a world in which power is still often the final arbiter? How do
we reconcile ends and means, principle and survival? How do we keep
secure both our existence and our values? These have been the moral
and intellectual dilemmas of the United States for two hundred years.
Id.
118. See Jerome Shestack, An Unsteady Focus: The Vulnerabilities of the Reagan
RTS. Y.R. 25, 49-50 (1989) (footAdministration's Human Rights Policy, 2 HARV. HUIMA.
notes omitted).
What reasons should motivate an administration to afford human rights
a central role in United States foreign policy as a matter of national
interest? I believe that there are at least the following compelling motivations:
1. Human rights values advance national security. Nations that accept
human rights are likely to be more stable and make better allies. Repression of human rights invites interventions and endangers stability.
Conversely, human rights include responsiveness to the will of the people
and restraints on aggressive action.
2. Human rights and world peace are interrelated. Peace and stability
cannot be maintained in a world in which people are repressed and impelled to rise up against their oppressors. Afghanistan, Armenia, Burundi,
Bangladesh, Haiti, the Philippines and many other places are stark examples.
3. Human rights are premised on the observance of rules of international law. Acceptance of the rule of law is a condition for a system of
world order which, in turn, promotes world peace.
4. Human rights have become a central item on the global agenda,
appealing to the expectations of people on every continent. The United
States is perceived as having an immense potential to further human
dignity and freedom. Championing human rights affords the United
States the opportunity to be relevant to that agenda and responsive to
the aspirations of people around the world.
5. Advancing economic and social human rights removes causes of
tension and instability among less developed nations and promotes an
equitable world order.
6. Human rights endeavors offer the United States the opportunity to
act in concert with other nations to generate "coalitions of shared purposes."
7. Human rights address one of the world's most pressing problems:
the enormous increase of refugees. The plight of refugees contributes to
international tensions, and refugees impose huge burdens on nations to
which they flee. Enforcing human rights will alleviate the suffering and
number of refugees.
8. Including human rights in foreign policy formulation is favored by
Congress. Without accommodation to this concern, the executive branch

1072

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1023

that self-regarding reasons can by themselves bear all the
weight. Put another way, it seems doubtful that any domestic
political argument that is not at least partly other-regarding-that does not appeal at least in part to the conviction that
every human being is sacred--can do the required work." 9
The self-regarding reasons are highly speculative.' 2 ° How confident are we that we Americans will eventually suffer if we
fail to take the Bosnian Muslims, for example, or the Tibetan
Buddhists, into the circle of our respect and concern? Confident
enough to incur the costs of taking them in? In any event, the
conviction that every human being is sacred is partly constitutive of the American identity.'2 ' (The Declaration of Independence famously proclaims: "We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among

faces a polarized foreign policy marked by continuing disputes with Congress. A consensus with Congress on human rights issues advances the
effectiveness and reliability of United States foreign policy initiatives.
9. Human rights policies command respect and support from this
nation's citizenry. Conversely, foreign policies which ignore human rights
are likely to be self-defeating by failing to sustain popular support.
10. Finally, advancing human rights reinforces this nation's own cohesion, its moral purpose and its appreciation of its own domestic liberties.
Human rights have long been a focus for shared purpose in this nation's
tradition, and a sense of shared purpose among its people is in the national interest.
Id.
119. See Richard B. Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic
Questions, 1969 WIs. L. REV. 171, 187-91 (commenting on "It]he difficulties in constructing a wholly selfish rationale for major national commitments to promote the
human rights of foreigners . . .

120. See id. at 191.
121. Cf. Richard B. Bilder, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Short-Term Prospects, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 597, 608-09 (1974).
Moral compromises ... may have real costs in terms of the way Americans view their own country and its role in the world. We are coming to
see that national pride, self-respect, cohesion, and purpose are meaningful
elements of both national power and domestic tranquility. It is true that
there are practical limits to what the United States can reasonably attempt to accomplish in promoting the human rights of other peoples. But,
in a period following Vietnam and Watergate, it may be worth some foreign policy risks to reassert historic American commitments to human
worth and dignity.
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these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."). 2 No
political argument for our nation taking the human rights of
distant peoples seriously will begin to have the power of an
argument that appeals at least in part to the conviction that all
human beings are sacred and "created equal and endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable Rights ... ."2' The
power of that conviction for most Americans derives in part
from the fact that in the United States, which remains a pervasively religious society, the conviction that human beings are
sacred is for most persons a religious conviction, even if for
some persons the conviction is not religious-indeed, even if the
conviction is not inescapably religious.
Unlike the definitional strategy, then, the self-regarding strategy for insisting that certain things not be done to any human
being and that certain other things be done for every human
being should not be dismissed. But the self-regarding strategy
is probably availing only or mainly as a buttress, a complement, to the strategy that relies on the idea of human rights
and on the conviction that every human being, even the lowliest inhabitant of the most alien, distant, and weak community,
is sacred. Significantly, neither individually nor even cumulatively can self-regarding reasons by themselves begin to account
for the passionate other-regarding character of most discourse
in support of human rights.
VI.
To suggest that the idea of human rights is ineliminably religious-that there is, finally, no coherent secular version of the
idea of human rights, that the conviction that human beings
are sacred is inescapably religious-is not to deny that one can
take human rights very seriously indeed without being religious. Agnostics, too, even atheists, can take human rights
seriously, and they, too, can love the Other. 2 4 Of course

122. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).

123. Id.
124. In his review of Love and Power, supra note 22, Ned Foley thought that I was
denying that one can be moral without being religious. See Edward P. Foley, Tillich
and Camus, Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 954, 964-77 (1992).
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atheists-like Albert Camus125-can take human rights
seriously. Of course they and other nonreligious persons can
love the Other. (Indeed, if the Other really is, in some deep
sense, one's sister/brother, then it would be surprising if every
nonreligious person were existentially disconnected from that
truth.126 But, of course, as the example of Camus attests, to
be connected to that truth existentially is not necessarily to
affirm it philosophically.) However, as the Polish philosopher
Leszek Kolakowski has written:
When Pierre Bayle argued that morality does not depend on
religion, he was speaking mainly of psychological independence; he pointed out that atheists are capable of achieving
the highest moral standards ... and of putting to shame

most of the faithful Christians. That is obviously true as far

as it goes, but this matter-of-fact argument leaves the question of validity intact; neither does it solve the question of
the effective sources of the moral
strength and moral convic" 127
tions of those "virtuous pagans.

That Camus achieved the highest moral standards, that he
loved the Other, even that, in doing so, he understood himself
to be engaged in a profound act of resistance and rebellion-resisting and rebelling against what he believed to be the
ultimate absurdity, or meaninglessness, of the universe 28-- leaves the question of validity intact."29 In par125. See id. at 965.
126. Cf. Neera Kapur Badhwar, Altruism v. Self-Interest: Sometimes a False Dichotomy, 10 SOC. PHIL. & POLY 90 (1993); Karl Monroe, et al., Altruism and the Theory of
Rational Action: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, 101 ETHICS 103 (1990).
127. LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, RELIGION 191-92 (1982) (emphasis added).
128. But cf. Jackson, supra note 63, at 9 ("Promethean self-creation and utterly
gratuitous care for others risks collapsing into its (putative) opposite, a self-destructive and domineering hubris."); Fred R. Dallmayr, Critical Theory and Reconciliation,
in MODERNITY AND PUBLIC THEOLOGY supra note 72, at 119, 139.

If the world is totally corrupt and perverse, then this world must be
destroyed and replaced by a completely new one through some kind of
creatio ex nihilo; moreover, given the removal of absolutes, such creation
can only be the work of human agents or producers. In this manner,
reconciliation and redemption become the targets of goal-directed activity,
that is, or purposive fabrication .... At the same time, being them-

selves part of the corrupt world, human agents can only perpetuate or
re-create the state of corruption; thus, instrumentalism becomes inescapable and self-destructive.

1993]

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGION

1075

ticular, and as Nietzsche saw clearly, it leaves intact the question: Why should we give a damn about the well-being of all
human beings, including the weak and the powerless-those
whom 3the
Gospel calls "the least of these brothers of
0
mine"?1
Now, "the question of validity," as Kolakowski calls it, is not
always at issue and is not always on the table. As I said, one
can, like Camus, love the Other without being religious. 31 If
two citizens, one of them religious, the other not, happen to
agree that the well-being of the Other is of fundamental importance, the question of validity does not arise as between
them. 3 2 But that the question does not arise as between them
does not mean that it does not arise as between or among others. After all, not everyone in the United States does, like
Camus, love the Other; not everyone does agree that the wellbeing of all human beings-including the weak and the powerless-is of fundamental importance; not everyone agrees that he
or she owes every human being respect or concern. The question of validity is often on the table-though often not explicitly-in the public square, as, for example, when redistributive
issues are being debated. 33 "Why should we be taxed to support them? Frankly, I don't give a damn about them. And even
if I did, I've worked hard for my money and it's all I can do to
take care of my own." The mere fact that one can love the Other without being religious does not begin to respond to the
question of validity when the question does arise, when it is at
issue. 34
Id.
129. KOLAKOWSKI, supra note 127, at 191-92.

130. Matthew 25:40.
131. For a series of meditations on Camus's work by one of the most important

Christian (Catholic) writers of the late 20th century-a writer who did not pretend
that Camus was in any way an "anonymous" Christian-see Thomas Merton, Seven
Essays on Albert Camus (1966-68), in THE LITERARY ESSAYS OF THOMAS MERTON 179301 (Patrick Hart ed., 1981).
132. Foley suggests that it would not have arisen as between Paul Tillich and Albert Camus. He also explains that it need not arise as between someone who is "prochoice" on the issue of abortion and someone who is "pro-life." See Foley, supra note
124, at 973-75.
133. Cf. Waldron, infra note 139.
134. Foley thinks that Camus' nonreligious response to the question of validity, no
less than a religious response, works. See Foley, supra note 126, 965-66. I am
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There is not only the question of validity. There is also, as
Kolakowski has said, "the question of the effective sources of
the moral strength and moral convictions of those 'virtuous pagans.'"' 8 5 Habermas is frank in acknowledging the problem-and bleak in what he has to say about it:
Who or what gives us the courage for such a total engagement that in situations of degradation and deprivation is
already being expressed when the destitute and deprived
summon the energy each morning to carry on anew? The
question about the meaning of life is not meaningless. Nevertheless, the circumstance that penultimate arguments
inspire no great confidence is not enough for the grounding
of a hope that can be kept alive only in a religious
language. The thoughts and expectations directed toward
the common good have, after metaphysics has collapsed,
only an unstable status.'3 6

inclined to say of any nonreligious response much the same thing Tim Jackson has
said of anti-realism:
Mhe loss of realism . . means the loss of any and all realities independent of or transcendent to inquiry. In this respect God must suffer the
same fate as any other transcendent subject or object. Because faith
makes sense only when accompanied by the possibility of doubt, Rorty's
distancing of scepticism means a concomitant distancing of belief in
"things unseen." He, unlike Kant, denies both knowledge and faith; but
for what, if anything, is this supposed to make room? Faith may perhaps
be given a purely dispositional reading, being seen as a tendency to act
in a certain way, but any propositional content will be completely lost.
The pull toward religious faith is at best a residue of metaphysical realism and of the craving for metaphysical comfort. The taste for the transcendent usually associated with a religious personality will find little
place in a Rortian world. Similarly, hope and love, if thought to have a
supernatural object or source, lose their point. The deconstruction of God
must leave the pious individual feeling like F. Scott Fitzgerald after his
crackup: "a feeling that I was standing at twilight on a deserted range,
with an empty rifle in my hand and the targets down." The
deconstructed heart is ever restless, yet the theological virtues stand only
as perpetual temptations to rest in inauthenticity. We live in a world
without inherent telos; so there simply is no rest as Christianity has
traditionally conceived it.
Timothy Jackson, The Theory and Practice of Discomfort: Richard Rorty and Pragmatism, 51 THOIST 270, 284-85 (1987).
135. KOLAKOWSKI, supra note 127 at 192.
136. HABERMAS, supra note 72, at 239.
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Consider, with respect to the problem of the adequacy of any
nonreligious response to that question, the relevance of what
Jackson has said about anti-realism:
[Lietting go of realism will in all probability leave a society
without the wherewithal to found or sustain a commitment
to liberty, equality, or fraternity-much less sorority. Such
a society may live for a time on past cultural capital embodied in liberal institutions and traditions, but a purely
conventional virtue will not last long. The issue is one of
motivation and consistency. 3 '
The bleakness of Habermas' statement-about the "unstable
status" that "thoughts and expectations directed toward the
common good have after metaphysics has collapsed"' 3 -lends
weight to Jackson's.
Many persons will have an understandable incentive to reject
the possibility that the idea of human rights is ineliminably
religious: persons who do not count themselves religious, including some who count themselves anti-religious, but who embrace
the idea of human rights-who embrace, in particular, the conviction that every human being is sacred (has inherent dignity,
is an end in himself, etc.). "The conviction that every human
being is sacred cannot be inescapably religious, for if it were,
how could we-we who are not religious, and who may even
look at religion as always and everywhere little more than a
childish superstition-defend the idea of human rights?" How
indeed?
For many religious persons and even for some nonreligious
persons, the idea of human rights simply does not make sense,
it does not exert a claim, apart from, cut off from, the Gospel
vision of the world and of our place in it-or from some equivalent religious vision.'39 Simone Weil wrote: "The Gospel

137. Jackson, supra note 134 at 289.
138. HABERMAS, supra note 72 at 239.
139. See Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN

DiEGo L. REv. 000, 000-00 (forthcoming 1992).
Consider, for example, the issue of whether property owners are
obliged by natural law to share their wealth with the poor. Locke's position on this is well known:
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makes no distinction between the love of our neighbor and
justice ....

The supernatural virtue of justice consists behav-

ing exactly as though there were equality when one is stronger
in an unequal relationship." 40 Some even fear that the only
conception of justice likely to flourish apart from the Gospel, or
some equivalent vision, once we have exhausted our "past cultural capital,"'
is the dispiriting conception implicit in
Nietzsche's genealogy of justice:
My dear Sir Long-Ears-and-Virtuous, we have no desire
whatever to be better, we are very contented with ourselves,
all we desire is not to harm one another-and therefore we
forbid certain actions when they are directed in a certain
way, namely against us, while we cannot sufficiently honor
these same actions provided they are directed against enemies of the community-against you, for instance. We edu-

[We know God hath not left one Man so to the Mercy of another,
that he may starve him if he please: God the Lord and Father of all,
has given no one of his Children such a Property, in his peculiar
Portion of the things of this World, but that he has given his needy
Brother a Right to the Surplusage of his Goods; so that it cannot
justly be denied him, when his pressings Wants call for it.
We could presumably rephrase this as follows: "A needy person has a
right to the surplus goods of a rich person if they are necessary to keep
him from perishing." But if we do, someone is likely to ask us for an
argument to support this controversial proposition. In Locke, the argument is based on the seminal fact of God's creating the world for the
sustenance of all men:
God made Man, and planted in him, as in all other Animals, a strong
desire of Self-preservation, and furnished the World with things fit for
Food and Rayment and other Necessaries of Life, Subservient to his
design, that Man should live and abide for some time upon the Face
of the Earth, and not that so curious and wonderful a piece of Workmanship by its own Negligence, or want of Necessaries, should perish
again presently after a few moments continuance ....
Once again, we could at a pinch translate that into secular language: "It
is common sense that people have a right to make use of the goods that
may help them to survive." But it loses a little in the translation. It is
hard to keep hold of the idea that we were meant to survive, and that
there is something offensive to the fact of our existence in our being denied access to the naturally available resources that we need.
Id. See also Rachel Mariner, Burdens Hard to Bear: A Theology of Civil Rights, 27
HARv. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 657 (1992).
140. SIMONE WEIL, WAITING FOR GOD 139, 143 (Emma Craufurd trans., 1973) (quoted at the beginning of Jackson, supra note 63).
141. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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cate our children in them; we cultivate them-If we shared
that "God-pleasing" radicalism that your holy madness recommends, if we were fools enough to condemn together with
those actions the source of them, the "heart," the "disposition," that would mean condemning our own existence and
with it its supreme prerequisite-a disposition, a heart, a
passion we honor with the highest honors. By our decrees,
we prevent this disposition from breaking out and expressing itself in an inexpedient way-we are prudent when we
make such law for ourselves, we are also moral-Have you
no suspicion, however faint, what sacrifice it is costing us,
how much taming, self-overcoming, severity toward ourselves it requires? We are vehement in our desires, there
are times when we would like to devour each other-But
the "sense of community" masters us: please note that this
is almost a definition of morality. 4 2
Clearly it is not enough to retreat (pace Richard Rorty?4 )
into a kind of ethnocentrism, proclaiming proudly and loudly
that, although among us late-twentieth-century North Americans and Western Europeans (and perhaps a few others), a
great fondness for human rights-or for "the moral point of
view"-is nothing more than an acquired taste; it is our acquired taste and that, if necessary, we are willing to fight and
even die for it). First, not even among all of us late-twentiethcentury North Americans, etc., has the taste-the aesthetic
preference-for human rights been acquired. Second, if the
fondness for human rights that some of us have is, at bottom,
nothing more than an acquired taste, there is little of consequence to say to those who have not acquired the taste-and
who may even have acquired a taste for violating (what we call)

142. NIETZSCHE, supra note 21 at 159-60. See Gauthier, supra note 108 and accompanying text. David Gauthier's "morality" seems quite Nietzschean.
143. See Bernard A. Williams, Auto-da-F6, N.Y. REV., Apr. 28, 1983, at 33.
Rorty is so insistent that we cannot, in philosophy, simply be talking
about human beings, as opposed to human beings at a given time ....
Rorty ...

contrasts the approach of taking some philosophical problem

and asking . .. ["w]hat does it show us about being human?" and asking, on the other hand, ["wihat does the persistence of such problems
show us about being twentieth-century Europeans?"
Id. (emphasis in original.) I recall Alasdair MacIntyre saying to Rorty, at a meeting
years ago (circa 1984), that all Rorty could say to Soviet Communists is: "You're unAmerican."
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human rights--other than, perhaps, "Try it, you'll like it (maybe)." Third, why shouldn't we try to disabuse ourselves of our
fondness for human rights, if it is only an acquired taste, once
it becomes clear that indulging that fondness can be, politically,
economically, and militarily a rather costly proposition? (I commented earlier on the limitations of a self-regarding strategy for
supporting human-rights-claims.)
Let me emphasize that nothing in this essay-nothing at
all-is meant to defend, as credible or even as appealing, any
religious-cosmological beliefs or any religious-moral beliefs,
much less to commend any such beliefs to anyone.' One certainly need not count oneself a religious person in order to
wonder-indeed, one can be one of those "good many professors
and other intellectuals [who] display a hostility or skeptical
indifference to religion that amounts to a thinly disguised contempt for belief in any reality beyond that discoverable by scientific inquiry and ordinary human experience"'4 5 and nonetheless wonder-whether the idea of human rights isn't ineliminably religious. One need not count oneself religious in order
to wonder whether much secular moral-philosophizing hasn't
been, for a very long time now, a kind of whistling in the
dark. 1'

144. Cf. Thomas Nagel, A Faith of the Enlightenment, TIMES LITERARY SUPP., Dec.
14, 1990, at 1341 ("a religious answer stands as much in need of defence and explanation as does a secular one.").
145. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 6 (1988).
See PERRY, supra note 22, at 67 & 173 n.1. Cf. RICHARD NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 86 (1984).

In the minds of some secularists the naked public square [i.e., neutral/impartial political discourse] is a desirable goal. They subscribe to
the dogma of the secular Enlightenment that, as people become more
enlightened (educated), religion will wither away; or, if it does not wither
away, it can be safely sealed off from public consideration, reduced to a
private eccentricity.

Id.
146. See Goldsworthy, supra note 106. Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229; see also P. Johnson, Nihilism and the End of Law,
FIRST THINGS, Mar. 1993, at 19.
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Nietzsche asked: "Now suppose that belief in God has vanished: the question presents itself anew: 'who speaks? " 14 7 Echoing Nietzsche's question a brutal century later, Art Leff wrote:
Napalming babies is bad.
Starving the poor is wicked.
Buying and selling each other is depraved.
Those who stood up to and died resisting Hitler,

Stalin, Amin, and Pol Pot-and General Custer toohave earned salvation.
Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned.
There is in the world such a thing as evil.
[All together now:] Sez who?
God help us.'

147. NETZSCHE, supra note 21, at 157.
148. Leff, supra note 146, at 1249.

